CHAPTER 3
48
Others said: “This we do not talk about.” In a similar manner as the
name Pelindaba was selected, the new site was named Valindaba, a
conjunction of two words common to many of the roughly seventy
languages indigenous to the southern tip of the African continent.
Individually, the words are “vala” meaning “to close” and “indaba”
meaning the council. Together, the meaning of these two words is
the “council is closed.” By extension, Valindaba means “no talking
about this.”
Newby- Fraser states that some cynically referred to the facil-
ity as “no comment.” Although this name did not last, he points
out that the term is apt to describe the behavior of UCOR, which
maintained extremely tight security over its activities. The 1970 law
creating UCOR instructed the government to withhold from the
public any information about the corporation and its activities that
could be considered “contrary to public interest.”
Figure 3.1 A 1991 KVR-1000 satellite image showing the Y Plant; to its immedi-
ate left is the main Pelindaba nuclear site (unannotated). Also shown are several
5000-series buildings. Source: www.isis- online.org and www.terraserver.
CHAPTER 5
120
shield) elements were made for the HEU plug as well. Figure 5.22
shows the oven and control panel.
The parts and subcomponents had to be integrated, or assem-
bled into a front or rear section of the nuclear device. To ensure
adequate security, a front and rear end were never integrated simul-
taneously. Figure 5.23 is a simplied schematic of the integration
process.
A special part of the integration process was called the “burn- in”
which was done at the nearby environment test facility. Testing at
this facility was necessary to ensure that the nuclear weapons could
withstand being transported and launched.
Figure 5.24 and 5.25 show opposite ends of the environmen-
tal test facility, which was built into the hillside. It had doors on
each end to allow vehicles to drive through the building. Figure
5.26 shows the facility from the bridge over the oval high speed test
track. The facility was made out of concrete since it was designed to
handle high explosives (up to 30 kilograms).
Figure 5.22 Vacuum induction furnace in Circle workshop that had earlier
been used to sinter the tamper subcomponents. The furnace was manufac-
tured by Degussa- Durferrit and has Honeywell control equipment. Photo
source: Armscor
By Amb. (Ret.) Jeremy Issacharoff
MIDDLE EAST WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION FREE ZONE SERIES
MIDDLE EAST WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION FREE ZONE SERIES
THE CONSULTATIONS
IN GLION AND GENEVA:
A VIEW FROM THE NEGOTIATING TABLE
Personal Recollections and Reections of the Informal Consultations
on the Middle East WMD-Free Zone Conference (2013–2014)
ISRAEL’S APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL
Before describing the informal consultations in Glion and Geneva, it
is important to recall the policy context that preceded them and had
an impact on the Israeli position during the talks. The consultations
began in late 2011 and culminated in ve sessions between October
2013 and June 2014 that were not renewed thereafter, notwithstand-
ing Israel’s willingness to do so.
The only previous consultations on these issues between Israel and
Arab countries were the multilateral Arms Control and Regional Se-
curity (ACRS) talks that took place pursuant to the Madrid Peace Con-
ference in the early 1990s. Those talks had also been discontinued by
the Arab states.
Israel’s approach to arms control developed over the years, par-
ticularly during the 1980s, with a clear emphasis on the need for
Between 2013-2014 representatives from Arab states, Iran and
Israel met to discuss convening the Middle East weapons of mass
destruction free zone (ME WMDFZ) Conference, which had been
mandated by the 2010 Review Conference for the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It was the rst time since the
1990s that states of the region discussed this issue face-to-face. The
meetings took place mainly in Glion and Geneva, Switzerland and
were facilitated by Ambassador Jaakko Laajava of Finland, and co-
convened by the Russian Federation, United Kingdom, and United
States, as well as the Secretary-General of the United Nations. This
ME WMDFZ paper series presents rsthand, personal reections and
lessons learned by those that participated in the meetings.
MIDDLE EAST WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION FREE ZONE SERIES
CARRIED OUT WITH FUNDING BY THE EUROPEAN UNION
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Jeremy Issacha-
roff was the Chief
Israeli represen-
tative and ne-
gotiator before
and during the
consultations in
Glion and Gene-
va. He had been
in the Israeli For-
eign Service for 40 years and recently
retired after serving as Israel’s Ambas-
sador to Germany between the years
2017 to 2022. Before Germany, Issacha-
roff was the Vice-Director General of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Head
of the Multilateral Affairs Directorate
and served as Deputy-Director General
for Strategic Affairs. He served abroad
twice in Washington DC and once in
the Permanent Mission of Israel to the
United Nations in New York. He has
the personal rank of Senior Ambassa-
dor and was appointed by the United
Nations Secretary General to the
Advisory Board for Disarmament in 2003.
The views expressed in the publica-
tion are the sole responsibility of the
individual author. They do not nec-
essarily reect the views or opinions
of the United Nations, UNIDIR, or
members of the ME WMDFZ Project
Reference Group.
ADVENA CENTRAL LABORATORIES
165
Figure 7.16 High Explosive Manufacturing Site
Figure 7.16 High Explosive Manufacturing Site
MIDDLE EAST WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION FREE ZONE SERIES
CARRIED OUT WITH FUNDING BY THE EUROPEAN UNION
MEANS OF DELIVERY:
A COMPLEX AND EVOLVING ISSUE IN THE
MIDDLE EAST WMD-FREE ZONE INITIATIVE
By Nasser bin Nasser
MIDDLE EAST WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION FREE ZONE SERIES
MIDDLE EAST WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION FREE ZONE SERIES
DEVELOPMENT AND COOPERATION
ON NUCLEAR RESEARCH AND ENERGY
IN THE MIDDLE EAST
WORKSHOP REPORT
MIDDLE EAST WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION FREE ZONE SERIES
CARRIED OUT WITH FUNDING BY THE EUROPEAN UNION
By Sarah Ruth Opatowski
MIDDLE EAST WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION FREE ZONE SERIES
MIDDLE EAST WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION FREE ZONE SERIES
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
C1: Security (2017)
C2: Economics (2015)
C3: Humanitarian (2017)
C4: Political (2017)
C5: Admin (2017)
C6: Legal (2017)
Proportion of Women in
UNGA Committees
in International Security and
32.4% 67.6%
38.3% 61.7%
48.9% 51.1%
33.9%
66.1%
36.8% 63.2%
34.1% 65.9%
Arab Women
The international security and disarmament field is characterized by a noticeable gender
imbalance, where women are underrepresented at all levels. On average, women make up 30%
of all delegates accredited to disarmament forums. This proportion is even lower when it comes
to heads of delegations. In comparison to other regions, the countries in the Middle East region
tend to have the lowest proportion of women delegates in disarmament forums.
Women and men have the right to participate in international security discussions and shape
the outcomes of decisions that will affect their lives.
Evidence suggests that greater women’s participation can increase prospects for peace,
reduce the likelihood of conflict and lead to more sustainable outcomes.
Unlocking professional opportunities for women can lead to greater stability, inclusiveness,
development, and economic growth.
Peacekeeping
WHY IT MATTERS
Disarmament
ARAB WOMEN IN...
Conflict Resolution
(Photo: IAEA) (Photo: UN Peacekeeping) (Photo: UN Women/Emad Karim)
Delegation Gender Balance
by Regional Groups
Source: 'Still Behind the Curve,' UNIDIR, 2019
Disarmament
Women Men
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Latin America and the Caribbean
Western European and Others
Eastern European
Asia-Pacific
African
Arab League States
42.6%
37.4%
34.2% 65.8%
25.4%
23.7% 76.3%
16.4%
83.6%
74.6%
57.4%
62.6%
By Tomisha Bino and Chen Zak Kane
MIDDLE EAST WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION FREE ZONE SERIES
MIDDLE EAST WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION FREE ZONE SERIES
MIDDLE EAST WMD-FREE ZONE
PROJECT
FINAL REPORT
From the Iran
Nuclear Deal to a
Middle East Zone?
Chen Zak & Farzan Sabet
EDITED BY
Lessons from the JCPOA
for an ME WMDFZ
UNIDIR’s Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free
Zone Project is supported by the European Union
Chen Zak Kane
Pathways Forward
forthe ME WMDFZ
Process and 2020
NPT Review
Conference
Conference Report
The conference and report were generously supported
by the Permanent Mission of Japan in Geneva
i
LESSONS FROM PAST VERIFICATION CASES
UNIDIR MIDDLE EAST WMD FREE ZONE
Nuclear
Verication in a
Middle East
WMD Free Zone
Lessons from Past
Verication Cases and Other
Precedents
John Carlson
MIDDLE EAST WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION FREE ZONE SERIES
UNIDIR’s Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free
Zone Programme is supported by the European Union
MIDDLE EAST WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION FREE ZONE SERIES
CARRIED OUT WITH FUNDING BY THE EUROPEAN UNION
