Vol. 41, June 2023
Key Points
The Arctic is the preeminent staging ground
for adversary missile attacks because it is the
most direct route from Moscow or Beijing to
Washington DC, and both Russia and China
are subsequently taking steps to increase their
foothold in the Arctic.
The size of the Arctic, and the potential for
large, unpredictable missile raids, creates
a need for new “left-of-launch” capabilities,
such as increased domain awareness, to give
U.S. leaders more options in a crisis.
The Department of Defense (DOD) should launch
a joint capability technology demonstration to
identify promising Arctic missile defeat efforts.
DOD and Congress should establish a
North American Defense Initiative to fund
Arctic domain awareness and infrastructure
upgrades.
The Air Force should exploit existing weapon
systems including Air National Guard MQ-9
Reapers and accelerate procurement of new
systems to bolster Arctic domain awareness.
DOD should continue collaboration with the
commercial space sector to enhance Arctic
communications and reconnaissance.
The United States should encourage allies
and partners to develop more missile defeat
capabilities by offering incentives such as
partnerships and intelligence exchanges.
e North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), as a
combined U.S.-Canada command charged with aerospace warning, aerospace
control, and maritime warning in the defense of North America, identies cruise
missile attacks as a serious threat to the U.S. homeland.
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Russia and China continue
to diversify their arsenals of guided missiles, which can y at low altitudes, have
unpredictable ight paths, may reach hypersonic speeds, and be launched from air,
sea, or subsurface platforms.
e Arctic has remained an attractive attack vector for both U.S. and Russian
long-range aviation and missiles since the earliest days of the Cold War. e
growing Arctic presence of China, a self-proclaimed “near-Arctic state” possessing
an increasingly robust long-range aviation and missile inventory, reinforces the
region’s signicance as a staging ground for air and cruise missile attacks.
e U.S. Department of Defense continues to invest billions to defend against
limited ballistic missile attacks, but the U.S. military’s ability to detect, track, and
defeat a cruise missile strike emanating from the Arctic has degraded signicantly
over the past 30 years. China or Russia could exploit this shortfall using conventional
cruise missile attacks to deal a quick blow that keeps U.S. military forces at distance
and avoid a nuclear response.
Bolstering deterrence against conventional air and cruise missile threats in the
Arctic starts by improving U.S., ally, and partner domain awareness and information
dominance capabilities. Adversaries will be disinclined to launch strikes on the U.S.
homeland if they know the United States is anticipating the attack and creating options
to dissuade it. Achieving better domain awareness involves eorts to provide indications
and warning of attacks through the detection, tracking, characterization, warning,
and attribution of modern threats.
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Establishing information dominance enables U.S.
leaders to access decision-quality information more quickly than adversaries. Domain
awareness and information dominance can underwrite a comprehensive “missile
defeat” strategy, left and right of launch, that gives U.S. leaders more options to deter
an attack on the U.S. homeland.
Abstract
Bolstering Arctic Domain
Awareness to Deter Air & Missile
Threats to the Homeland
by Dr. Caitlin Lee
Senior Fellow, Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies
with Aidan Poling
Research Analyst, Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies
MITCHELL INSTITUTE
Policy Paper
