JENNIFER LAMPING LEWIS, TERRENCE K. KELLY, GRANT JOHNSON, DOUGLAS C. LIGOR,
ANTHONY JACQUES, BARBARA BICKSLER
Army Explosive Ordnance
Disposal in Large-Scale
Combat Operations
Summary of Findings and Recommendations
T
he U.S. Army’s explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) mission is complex and cuts across
both military and civilian activities. According to Army Regulation 75-15, “Army EOD
provides integrated and layered protection support to forces, civil authorities and critical
infrastructure” (Army Regulation 75-15, 2019, p. 1). In addition to the Army EOD force’s
combat missions, defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) missions, in particular, are mandated
KEY FINDINGS
■ The U.S. Army and its explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) forces are changing to address
large-scale combat operations (LSCO).
■ The planned EOD force structure is too small for EOD forces to execute Army doctrine in
LSCO. There will be more demands for EOD forces than they can meet under current doctrine.
■ Furthermore, these force structure shortfalls do not account for defense support of civil
authorities (DSCA) missions, which include providing protection to the President of the
United States and are considered homeland defense missions in wartime.
■ Should planned EOD force structure be expanded to meet the demands of LSCO and DSCA,
forecasts indicate that the inventory of EOD personnel in the Regular Army will be sufficient
to fill the units that would execute these missions.
■ In contrast, the forecasted inventory of EOD personnel in the Army National Guard will not
be sufficient to support the expanded force structure, with significant shortfalls across all
grades, particularly in the senior ranks.
■ There is no compelling case for designating EOD personnel as special operations forces.
Concerns about how EOD forces support special operations forces can be addressed in
other ways.
■ There is an argument for making EOD a basic branch, although doing so would require addi-
tional resources.
Research Report
