重新构建特种作战部队-网络-空间三位一体 特种作战对太空战的贡献(2024)9页

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页数:9页

时间:2024-06-21

金币:15

上传者:Iris
121
MILITARY REVIEW Space & Missile Defense 2024
Reframing the Special
Operations Forces-
Cyber-Space Triad
Special Operations
Contributions to Space Warfare
Maj. Brian Hamel, U.S. Army
SOF has a culture of decentralized combat operations with
a focus in the human domain.
Col. Mark Orwat
Humans are always in the loop of spaceowe.
Dr. Bledyn Bowen
I
n November 2021, the commander of the U.S.
Army Special Operations Command, Lt. Gen.
Jonathan Braga, articulated a new deterence
framework to his sta.
1
is emergent framework
included the space, cyberspace, and ecial operations
communities having symbiotic relationships to con-
verge eects throughout the competition continuum.
As a homage to the nuclear Triad (intercontinental
balistic missiles, submarine-launched balistic missiles,
and strategic bombers), this “ecial operations forces
(SOF)-cyberspace-space Triad” provides policymakers
aditional options to campaign against our adversaries.
While the Triad has made substantial headway, no ex-
isting literature delineates the nexus of the SOF-space
relationship. Joint Pulication 3-14, Space Operations,
and Field Manual 3-14, Ary Space Operations, are
both quick to point out that SOF receives eects
from space, but only a few student theses and authors
tangentialy describe how SOF can create eects in
the space domain.
2
In this study, the author elucidates
the SOF-space segment of the Triad and recommends
that the joint SOF enterprise conduct preparation of
the environment, ecial reconnaissance, and military
information suport operations to set the conditions
to inuence, deceive, or degrade adversarial terestri-
al-based, space-enaling infrastructure.
Unfortunately, SOF has not clearly dened how
it can generate eects in the space domain. Failure to
prescriptively delineate eects ensures that our adver-
saries wil continue to hold positions of relative advan-
tage and predisposes any eorts to failure due to their
inability to be accurately measured and war-gamed
prior to execution. is sharply increases risk to force
and risk to mission. Curent unclassied literature ex-
plains that SOF receives eects from the space domain
through services such as satelite communications;
positioning, navigation, and timing; and inteligence,
surveilance, and reconnaissance. is article expounds
on how SOF core aivities, normaly conducted during
ireular warfare (IW), can create eects in the space
domain to advance concepts within the Triad and pro-
vide exile response options to counter the Peoples
Liberation Army Strategic Suport Force, which was
created in 2015.
3
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