Vol. 51, July 2024
Key Points
In a large-scale conflict with the People’s Republic
of China (PRC), U.S. Air Force air bases in the Indo-
Pacific will face sustained, complex, integrated
attacks that include simultaneous strikes by
ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, hypersonic
weapons, and armed drones.
The capacity and accuracy of adversary long-
range strikes have altered combat paradigms
and threaten to drive U.S. combat aircraft to
rear-area bases that are at less risk of attack but
too distant from the operational battlespace to
enable combat-relevant operations.
If the U.S. military is unable to generate operationally
relevant combat air power from inadequately
defended forward air bases, adversaries may perceive
an opportunity to achieve consequential objectives
without the deterrent of a timely U.S. military response.
A combination of integrated active and passive
defensive measures will allow the Air Force to
sustain effective combat sortie generation rates
while under enemy fire. The current capabilities
and capacities of both active and passive air
defenses are inadequate to sufficiently protect U.S.
air bases and other critical facilities on adversary
target lists, especially in the Indo-Pacific.
Congress should direct that DOD clarify Title X roles
and responsibilities for fielding ground-based active
missile defenses to ensure the Air Force can generate
the required combat sorties while under attack.
Congress and DOD should allocate resources
to enable the Air Force to implement ACE and
deploy capabilities to rapidly reconstitute air
base operations after attacks. New funding and
personnel allocations must accompany any new
air base defense mission assigned to the Air Force.
U.S. Air Force commanders must be prepared to ght their frontline
air bases like any other weapon system. eir air bases must have the capacity
to counter complex integrated air and missile strikes, rapidly reconstitute their
operational capabilities when damaged, and continue to generate combat eects
while under attack: these capabilities are critical to the success of future joint force
operations.
Yet over the past 30 years, Air Force air base defenses, especially in the
Western Pacic, have atrophied due to a lack of resources and funding. ese
deciencies imperil the service’s ability to provide joint commanders with force
generation and striking options to secure U.S. interests and defeat aggression that
threatens the international order. e Air Force and supporting military services
must eld cost-eective air and missile defense solutions to confound adversary
targeting eorts and drive up attack costs against U.S. air bases in order to
remain a relevant “inside force” capable of ghting alongside America’s allies
and partners. Air defense solutions should include a combination of dispersing
forward operating forces, elding eective active and passive air and missile
defenses, and reconstituting air base operations after attacks to provide the
necessary air base resilience. Eective active and passive defenses for the dispersed
forces are also required. Active defenses include modular, layered kinetic and
non-kinetic systems, including airborne systems, to counter inbound missile
and drone threats. Passive defenses include early warning and threat tracking,
signicant hardening of air base facilities, damage control, and reconstitution
capabilities, including substantial runway repair at each dispersed air base.
To date, neither Congress nor the Department of Defense (DOD) have
adequately funded air base defense requirements. Without an immediate reversal
of this trend, the Air Force may be unable to generate operationally relevant
combat airpower in a near peer conict, which would likely have devastating
impacts on joint and combined campaigns. Inadequate air base defense also
strains alliances, incentivizes potential aggressors, and may ultimately result in a
strategic loss that has existential consequences for the United States and its allies.
Abstract
Fighting the Air Base:
Ensuring Decisive Combat Sortie
Generation Under Enemy Fire
by J. Michael Dahm
Senior Resident Fellow for Aerospace and China Studies
MITCHELL INSTITUTE
Policy Paper
