Approved for Public Release
Distribution Unlimited
1
21-652
SOF-CF Interoperability in Large-Scale
Combat Operations
Insights from the Warghter Exercises
MAJ David M. Spangenberg
July 2021
Introduction
W
arghter exercises (WFXs) train special
operations forces (SOF) and conventional
forces (CF) in a simulated, multi-domain,
large-scale conict against a peer-level threat.
While these forces have distinct mission sets, their
interoperability is essential for a unity of eort to
achieve success on the battleeld. These exercises have
highlighted two interrelated areas that consistently
impact SOF-CF interoperability, particularly within
the division and corps command posts. These two
areas are knowledge of SOF capabilities and roles
of liaison ocers. The purpose of this article is to
discuss these two areas, highlighting the observed
challenges and best practices from the exercises over
the last few years. This article also discusses some
unresolved issues still requiring additional attention,
and it provides recommendations for improving
SOF-CF interoperability within the exercises.
Knowledge of SOF Capabilities
Reports from the recent WFXs have consistently
stressed the challenges posed by knowledge gaps
within CF stas and headquarters concerning SOF
capabilities, limitations, and missions. One Mission
Command Training Program (MCTP) observation
stressed that “division and corps stas lack a clear
understanding of SOF capabilities during large-scale
combat operations (LSCO).”
1
This gap in knowledge
often leads CF sta and planners to consider SOF strictly
as a tactical reconnaissance or precision strike force.
In one exercise, a division submitted “a broad request
to ‘provide intelligence’ on an entire city. The request
did not provide a specic area of focus, a requested
timeframe, or a dened purpose for which the
division made the request.”
2
Further, CF often failed
to consider SOF’s ability to operate with indigenous
forces as a sizeable tactical unit that could help
signicantly shape conditions on the battleeld. This
knowledge gap has limited CFs’ perspective on how
SOF missions could support or enable their own.
Additionally, CF have struggled to understand
the variances with SOF concerning time and
planning horizons. A CALL WFX post-exercise
report highlighted that “the division tries to plan
between 72 and 96 hours while very often becoming
xated on the next 12 hours. On the contrary, SOF,
like Special Forces working with indigenous forces,
have planning horizons well beyond 96 hours,
often planning weeks or months in advance.”
3
This is particularly true when SOF are operating in
the strategic deep areas, contested or denied by enemy
forces, requiring deliberate planning and eorts to avoid
detection or compromise. One MCTP observation
reinforced this stating, “Multiple attempts to leverage
SOF eorts did not aord SOF assets time to conduct
eective actions. Operating in a heavily denied
environment, working with partner-nation forces, and
leveraging unconventional warfare networks typically
is a deliberate and time-consuming process.”
4
These
variances in time-planning horizons and mission
considerations often have led to challenges and mutual
frustration during the exercises, particularly when CF
requests SOF support within the next 12 to 24 hours.
