Approved for Public Release
Distribution Unlimited
The Deep Area: Misconceptions and Challenges
LTC David M. Spangenberg
No. 22-701
March 2022
Introduction
Recent Warfighter Exercises (WFXs) have demonstrated that divisions often struggle to plan and
execute deep operations. This negatively impacts the brigades in close contact with enemy forces.
The purpose of this article is to aid units with deep operations. To do this, it first discusses division
planners’ varying conceptions of the deep area and the consequences for each. It next reviews
doctrine concerning deep operations, highlighting potential areas that may either help or contribute
to these issues. Finally, it offers recommended approaches and additional considerations to help
units overcome the deep area challenges.
1
Defining and Visualizing the Deep Area
WFXs have highlighted that units and planners do not consistently define or visualize the deep
area in the same way. Observations and trends have revealed three varying
perspectives/conceptions units and planners often have of the deep area. These conceptions
typically define and/or treat the deep almost exclusively in either space, time, or specific enemy
systems.
Deep in Space
Many units strictly define the deep area in accordance with their boundaries or fire control
measures (FCM). Most commonly, divisions have defined the deep area as the terrain between its
coordinated fire line (CFL) and the fire support coordination line (FSCL). This has led to several
issues. First, this approach has led planners to view the deep as a separate effort in itself, de-linking
the division’s deep and close operations. With this, divisions target and shape in their designated
deep area, but these shaping efforts do not necessarily support or set conditions for the current or
next close fight.
2
Next, by defining the deep area in space only, units often neglect deep operations
due to a lack of enemy presence in their defined deep area. This often narrows a unit’s focus to its
close area, reducing its shaping efforts within the greater AO. Lastly, units often fail to shift
boundaries or FCMs at the pace of an advance, leading to a convergence of deep and close areas.
3
This often leads to confusion in terms of area responsibility as well as missed targeting
opportunities.
Deep in Time
While units do not define the deep area explicitly by time, WFX observations highlight that many
planners consider and discuss the deep area in terms of future operations and time. This leads to
units considering the close fight as the only current fight, neglecting opportunities for
current/immediate deep operations against unengaged enemy forces. Many comments highlight
that planners have often viewed the close fight within the next 24-hours and the deep fight within
the following 72-96 hours. This tendency became even more apparent as the intensity of close area
combat increased. During these times, division current operations integration cells almost solely
focused on the close and immediate (within the next 12-hours) fight at the expense of the deep
