SMALL WARS JOURNAL
smallwarsjournal.com
Theory, Policy, and Strategy:
A Conceptual Muddle
Adam Elkus and Mark Safranski
It is impossible not to notice that elements of the current acrimonious debates over theory,
operations, and practice are proxies for larger political differences over the use of force and its
relationship to American national interests. So why are these fundamental policy disagreements
being expressed through debate over technical points of military doctrine?
The answer lies in the uncertain, even negligent, muddle that has substituted for a clear paradigm
to guide US grand strategy. Because policymakers have failed to define clear US interests, goals,
and objectives, attempts have been made to derive grand strategic principles from theoretical
debates or operational concerns. While these debates have been intellectually stimulating and
often very useful to developing US national security and military doctrine, they cannot sustain
US grand strategy. While strategic drift might be inevitable in country where much of strategy is
determined by the cleavages of domestic politics, the cost of meandering can be measured in lost
opportunities, treasure squandered, and lives lost. Policymakers must make a stand for a strong
strategic paradigm to guide US operational methodologies.
Defining Strategy Down
The making of US strategy has always been problematic. The important role of domestic politics,
lobbies, and political partisanship in the formation of foreign policy and national defense often
results in strategic incoherence. In a duality that diplomatic historian Walter McDougall called
“Promised land, Crusader state”, the American public is often split between an idealistic desire to
remake the world, realist concerns of access to strategic resources and balances of power, and a
reflexive isolationism that flares up every once and a while to frustrate policymakers’ grand
strategic designs.
1
Winston Churchill noted with some exasperation that “the Americans will
always do the right thing... after they've exhausted all the alternatives."
Strategic drift is a traditional American problem, but one that has been exacerbated by the lack of
a clear paradigm and the existential threat of a hegemonic adversary. As a result, conceptual
confusion has emerged over the meaning of changes in the international system, the threat posed
by enemies that frustrate established American defense concepts, the residual shock of
September 11, and a profoundly venomous atmosphere of political partisanship, all of which
contribute to an intellectual fog that works against achieving clarity when formulating policy.
1
Walter McDougall, Promised Land, Crusader State: the American Encounter with the World since 1776, New
York, Houghton Mifflin, 1997.
