USI of India | An article by USI
file:///C|/Inetpub/wwwroot/web/Latest13Jun12/counter%20naxal%20strat.htm[6/18/2012 12:58:14 PM]
Crafting a Counter- Naxalite Strategy
Ms Vinita Priyedarshi*
Introduction
Tracing its origin to the 1967 Naxalbari movement of West Bengal, forty years
down the line Naxalism has come to acquire new dimensions. This led Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh to call it the single largest threat to India’s internal security. Today,
around 235 districts are affected by Naxalism in varying degrees which has led to
innumerable loss of life and resources of the country. The stated aim of the Naxalites,
to capture power in Delhi, is no longer a secret looking at their strategy of penetration
into the urban areas. The Government has to date treated this as a law and order
problem and has tried to address it through a three pronged strategy comprising the
use of force, dialogue and addressing the socio-economic causes which were
responsible for the movement taking roots among the tribals.
Going by the success witnessed by Andhra Pradesh in containing the threat of
Naxalism with a similar strategy, nothing seems amiss in the strategy itself. Then why
is it that the same strategy does not seem to yield similar results in other Naxal
affected states? This is because each prong has a number of imperatives attached.
These form an intrinsic part of the overall strategy which the Government has failed to
knit into a comprehensive whole. Until each of these imperatives are addressed and
interlinked to formulate a comprehensive and coordinated counter-Naxalite strategy,
success will continue to elude the security forces. The counter-Naxal experience of
the states shows that whenever these strategic imperatives have been considered, the
strategy has paid dividends. There is, therefore, an urgency to make the agencies
dealing with Naxalism aware of these strategic imperatives and incorporate these at
the tactical and operational levels.
Strategic Imperatives Associated with the Strategy of Use of Force
To examine the first prong of the strategy, which emphasises ‘use of force’, there are
a number of interlinked imperatives. These are: firstly, the amount and type of force
which should be used in such actions. Secondly, the type of training which such forces
should be imparted. Thirdly, the weapons which they should possess and fourthly,
their method of operations. So far the Counter-Insurgency (CI) strategy has focussed
on the use of Central Police Forces (CPOs) or the raising of Special Task Forces like
the Greyhounds or the Cobras without analysing the lacunae associated with the use
of CPOs in CI operations. It is suggested that the use of CPOs should be considered
only after duly analysing these strategic imperatives as otherwise, their effectiveness
could be doubtful.
