SMALL WARS JOURNAL
smallwarsjournal.com
End States vs. Strategies
Vegetius
I don’t know who came up with the term “exit strategy”, but if he (or she) is still alive he should
be taken out and shot. An exit is not a strategy; it is a retreat. There is nothing wrong with cutting
losses and running if the situation dictates, but let’s call it what it is. However, let’s also make
sure that the war is lost before we resort to that. In Iraq and Afghanistan we have stated exit
strategies, but no clear stated vision of what we want either nation to look like when we are done.
If getting out of these two wars is our only objective, we need to fire the entire national security
apparatus and replace its personnel with divorce lawyers; they are the true exit strategists.
The great strategists in history have always had clear end states of what they had in mind for the
strategic landscape that they were dealing with and knew how to match those ends to available
means. Perhaps the greatest practitioner of this approach in modern times was Otto Von
Bismarck. The Iron Chancellor had a clear vision of a greater Germany united under Prussian
leadership. He moved carefully to make this happen with three limited objective wars in which
he diplomatically outmaneuvered his opponents, isolating his intended victims from military and
political outside support. In doing so, he always ensured that the Prussian military did not stray
outside his intended use for armed force in achieving the desired end state.
Our strategic situation is obviously different. Today, we are engaged in a war against radical
Islamic expansionism rather than the kind of voluntary wars of dynastic expansion that Bismarck
engineered. Our situation is more similar to that of the Byzantine Empire, and we have the same
enemy, albeit in a new incarnation; that being expansionist radical Islamic Jihad. The Byzantine
grand strategy of containing radical Jihadist Islam succeeded for approximately seven centuries.
The Eastern Roman Empire had a comprehensible strategic framework for dealing with this
Jihadist threat. Thus far, we do not.
Iraq and Afghanistan are wars of containment against radical expansionist Islam. There may or
may not have been Jihadists in Iraq when we got started, but there are now; that is a fact that we
have to deal with. What we lack is a clear vision for what we want these nations to look like in
the long run after Americans are no longer in the lead in the containment battle. Lacking a clear
vision of end state, we are left with an exit non- strategy.
As Edward Luttwak points out in The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire, the philosophy of
Jihad is one of continuous conflict; truces are allowed, and some have lasted for centuries, but
this is a forever war. Consequently, we should have a strategic framework, not just for the wars
we have, but for dealing with the conflicts to come. With such a framework, we would be better
