1 Institute for the Study of War & The Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 3
Kateryna Stepanenko, Mason Clark, and George Barros
June 3, 7:30 pm ET
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu claimed that Russian forces will “accelerate”
the “special military operation” in Ukraine in a meeting with Chechen Leader Ramzan
Kadyrov on June 3, though Russian forces are unlikely to be able to do so. Kadyrov said
that Shoigu has “identified new tasks” that will improve the effectiveness of Russian offensive
maneuvers and improve Russian tactics.
1
Kadyrov did not specify which tasks Russian forces will
undertake to speed up their pace. Shoigu previously claimed on May 24 that Russian forces were
making slow progress in eastern Ukraine to avoid civilian casualties.
2
In a retrospective on the 100th
day of the war, the UK Defense Ministry stated that Russian forces will likely establish control over
Luhansk Oblast in the next two weeks, though only at significant further cost.
3
The UK Defense Ministry
further noted that Russian forces on all other axes have gone over to defensive operations to concentrate
all available forces in Severodonetsk, and stated Russia will need to commit sizable investment of
manpower and equipment—that it will be unable to generate quickly, if at all—to advance beyond
Luhansk Oblast.
A Russian milblogger published a lengthy message on June 3 claiming that nearly the
entire 35th Combined Arms Army has been destroyed in Izyum due to incompetent
Russian commanders. A Russian milblogger under the pseudonym Boytsovyi Kot Murz said that
Russian commanders did not account for combat challenges in the Izyum woods, leading to significant
losses in the 64th and 38th Separate Guard Motor Rifle Brigades, which he reported now have less than
100 servicemen in total.
4
Boytsovyi Kot Murz claimed that Russian commanders failed to provide
necessary equipment to units fighting in wooded terrain and did not repair Russian heavy artillery in a
timely manner. Russian forces also reportedly lacked effective communication with command centers
and relied on messengers due to the shortage of encrypted phones. Boytsovyi Kot Murz noted that the
lack of communications between Russian units and commanders allowed Ukrainian forces to strike
Russian advanced positions with drones. Russian private military company servicemen from Wagner
also refused to participate in combat, leading to a significant lack of advances on the Izyum axis. While
ISW cannot independently confirm these reports, they are consistent with previous reports of Russian
operations and high casualties on the Izyum axis.
Russian and proxy forces reportedly have not sufficiently prepared frontline units with
medical supplies, leading to abysmal medical care. Boytsovyi Kot Murz criticized the Russian
Defense Ministry for failing to prepare medical equipment and field hospitals for wounded servicemen.
5
Russian commanders reportedly failed to learn lessons from the lack of medical equipment during the
Battle of Debaltseve in 2015 and are repeating similar mistakes. Boytsovyi Kot Murz claimed that
Russian forces do not provide frontline troops with high pressure bandages and other supplies
necessary to address limb injuries in time. Boytsovyi Kot Murz compared expired and underprepared
Russian first aid kits to higher quality Ukrainian supplies and claimed that Russian forces do not have
volunteer support that could address the shortages in military equipment. Boytsovyi Kot Murz noted
that only Russian infantry, that he claimed has been defeated, had necessary medical training—while
