1 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 31
Karolina Hird, Katherine Lawlor, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan
October 31, 9:00 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily
alongside the static maps present in this report.
Russian forces conducted another massive wave of missiles strikes targeting critical Ukrainian
infrastructure across the country on October 31, likely in an attempt to degrade Ukraine’s will to fight as
temperatures drop. Russian forces fired over 50 Kh-101 and Kh-555 missiles from the northern Caspian Sea and the
Volgodonsk region of Rostov Oblast, targeting critical Ukrainian energy infrastructure.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff
reported that Ukrainian air defenses shot down 44 out of over 50 Russian missiles.[2] Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys
Shmyhal reported that the strikes damaged 18 mostly energy-related targets across 10 Ukrainian regions.[3] Ukrainian
officials reported that Russian strikes cut off water to 80% of Kyiv residents on October 31 and left hundreds of thousands
without power.[4]
Russian occupation officials once again shifted their rhetoric regarding the Kakhovka Hydroelectric
Power Plant (HPP) and are likely setting information conditions to continue to drive evacuations from the
west bank of the Dnipro River and provide rhetorical cover for a Russian withdrawal from the area. Kherson
Occupation Head Vladimir Saldo announced on October 31 that his administration is expanding the evacuation zone by
15km from the Dnipro River and cited information that Ukraine is preparing for a “massive missile attack” of the Kakhovka
HPP dam, which Saldo alleged will cause massive flooding and destruction of civilian infrastructure.[5] Saldo previously
claimed on October 26 that it would be “practically impossible” to destroy the dam and that even in case of a breach, the
water level of the Dnipro River would only rise 2 meters.[6]
The apparent oscillation in Saldo’s position on the Kakhovka HPP indicates that his administration is likely using threats of
breach and flooding to perpetuate an information operation with a two-fold purpose: to drive evacuations from the west
bank and to explain away a future Russian withdrawal from the west bank. These is no scenario in which it would be
advantageous for Ukraine to blow the dam. The ramifications that such an action would have on the safety of the
Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), which relies on the water in the Kakhovka reservoir for coolant, and the
economic and social implications of flooding over 80 settlements and destroying civilian homes and viable land, entirely
preclude the possibility that this is a contingency Ukraine may pursue. Blowing the dam would also make it much harder
for Ukrainian forces to achieve their stated aims of liberating the remainder of Kherson Oblast and other territories east of
the river. Saldo’s statements are likely therefore meant to encourage residents of the west bank to promptly evacuate and
may also establish informational cover for a Russian withdrawal from the west bank. Saldo could be framing the dam
explosion as an inevitable and insurmountable obstacle that Russian forces could only avoid by abandoning the west bank
and retreating further into Kherson Oblast. Russia’s ability or willingness to physically damage the dam is relatively
immaterial—the informational effects of accusing Ukraine of preparing to blow the dam could be sufficient to create
rhetorical cover to explain away any future Russian withdrawals.
Russian forces are likely continuing to move troops and military assets across the Dnipro River in
anticipation of Ukrainian advances towards Kherson City. Ukrainian military sources reported on October 30 that
Russian forces are preparing to move artillery units and weapons from the west bank of the Dnipro River for possible
redeployment in other directions.[7] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command additionally noted on October 31 that
Russian forces are preparing to evacuate individual units and military equipment from the west bank and have collected
watercraft to facilitate the evacuation.[8] Russian-backed Kherson occupation deputy Kirill Stremousov stated that on
October 30 Russian forces also began engineering positions in Bilozerka (6km due west of Kherson City) and Chornobaivka
(1km north of Kherson City), which is corroborated by imagery posted by reported Russian collaborators of barbed wire
defenses in these areas.[9] The fact that Russian collaborators are preparing to defend Chornobaivka is particularly
noteworthy, as Chornobaivka is the last settlement along the M14 north of Kherson City. The current frontline lies less than
20km northwest of Chornobaivka, and active efforts to bolster defense here indicate concern for an imminent Ukrainian
advance. The simultaneous evacuation of military assets from the west bank and preparations for the defense of critical
areas around Kherson City indicate serious anxiety over Russian control of the west bank.
Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin continued his efforts to increase his status among Russian elites and
his presence in St. Petersburg by attacking local officials and announcing the creation of a PMC Wagner
Center in St. Petersburg on October 31. Prigozhin reportedly requested on October 31 that the Russian Prosecutor
General’s office open a criminal investigation into the “fact” that St. Petersburg Governor Alexander Beglov organized a
“criminal community” in St. Petersburg.[10] Prigozhin alleged that Beglov’s criminal network intends to plunder the state
