1 Institute for the Study of War & The Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 1
Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Frederick W. Kagan
June 1, 5:30pm ET
The Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kherson Oblast has gotten the attention of Russian forces in
the area, and the Russians are scrambling to secure the vital ground line of communication
(GLOC) the Ukrainians have threatened. Ukrainian forces carried out a series of organized counterattacks
targeting settlements on the eastern bank of the Ihulets River that are very close to a key highway supporting
Russian forces further north. The Russians have responded by destroying the bridges the Ukrainians used in one
of those counterattacks and other bridges across the river in an effort to hold their line against anticipated
continued Ukrainian counter-offensive operations. Ukrainian forces are likely still close enough to the highway
to disrupt its use as a main supply route, potentially undermining the Russians’ ability to hold against Ukrainian
counter-offensives from the north.
Russian milbloggers are expressing growing alarm about the threat of Ukrainian
counteroffensives in the areas Russian forces have deprioritized while concentrating on
Severodonetsk. Russian milbloggers have increasingly focused on tracking the rate of Ukrainian
counterattacks in late May.
1
Pro-Russian Telegram channel “Dmitriyev” (over 100,000 followers) reported that
Ukrainian forces are fully capable of inflicting ”painful and cutting blows” on Russian GLOCs in Kherson,
Kharkiv, and Zaporizhia Oblasts by July-August due to lack of adequate Russian defensive forces in the areas.
2
Former Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officer and milblogger Igor Girkin claimed that Ukrainian forces
“will grope for weakness” in Russian defenses in Kherson Oblast.
3
Russian milbloggers are effectively criticizing
the Russian military command for endangering Russian territorial gains across other axes by prioritizing the
Donbas offensive operation so heavily.
Russian authorities are likely anticipating Ukrainian partisan pressure in Luhansk Oblast. The
Main Ukrainian Intelligence Directorate (GUR) announced on June 1 the launch of the “Luhansk partisan”
project to galvanize resistance to Russian attempts to consolidate control of Luhansk Oblast.
4
A Russian
Telegram channel reported that the Russian Internal Ministry is sending a special detachment of its employees
on “leave” to the Luhansk People's Republic (LNR), which is a likely attempt to reinforce Russian administrative
presence in the LNR in the face of growing internal and partisan discontent.
5
The Ukrainian General Staff
additionally stated that Russian forces moved a battalion tactical group (BTG) to Kupyansk, a Russian-controlled
city in eastern Kharkiv Oblast along the P07 highway within 30 kilometers of the Luhansk Oblast administrative
border.
6
Kupyansk is far from the front lines and in no apparent danger of imminent Ukrainian conventional
attack. Taken together, the reported deployment of Internal Ministry employees and a BTG suggest that Russian
forces are anticipating partisan resistance against their attempts to gain control of Luhansk Oblast.
Russian forces continue to undermine the economic viability of areas they are attempting to
capture. Russian forces reportedly hit the “Azot” fertilizer production plant in Severodonetsk on May 31 and
caused the dissemination of toxic nitric acid smoke.
7
The production plant was an economically-significant
resource for Severodonetsk and the Luhansk region and it would have been prudent for Russian forces to
maintain and take control of the plant’s production capabilities. Russian forces similarly destroyed the Azovstal
Steel Plant in Mariupol, which had considerable industrial significance for Ukraine and could have been
economically exploited by Russian occupiers if they had not destroyed it. While the Azot plant in Severodonetsk
was less productive on whole than Azovstal, its destruction is part of the systemic failure of Russian forces to
take effective control of the economic and industrial capabilities of occupied territory. Russian forces will likely
continue to destroy productive infrastructure and continually undermine the economic benefits they could have
hoped to gain from occupied territories.
Key Takeaways
