1 Institute for the Study of War & AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment
Karolina Hird, Mason Clark, and George Barros
May 10, 7:15pm ET
The Ukrainian counteroffensive north of Kharkiv City continued to successfully push
Russian forces toward the Russia-Ukraine border on May 10. Ukrainian forces liberated
several towns north of Kharkiv City and continued pushing north of the recently liberated Staryi Saltiv
to capture several towns northeast of Kharkiv: a Russian source claimed that Ukrainian troops
advanced to within 10km of the Russian border, though ISW cannot independently confirm these
specific claims.
Russian forces from the Izyum area are reportedly redeploying northwards to attempt
to alleviate the pressure of this counteroffensive and stymie further northward advances toward the
Russian border.
The Ukrainian counteroffensive will likely continue to divert Russian troops and
resources from deployment to other axes of advance where fighting has been similarly stalled out by
the successful Ukrainian defense. The counteroffensive will impede the ability of Russian artillery to
target the northeastern suburbs of Kharkiv City, will potentially enable Ukrainian forces to threaten
Russian rear areas with their own shelling and further attacks, and—if Ukrainian forces are able to
further advance the counteroffensive or Russian forces collapse along the Kharkiv axis and withdraw
further—unhinge Russian offensive operations around Izyum.
The Belarusian Ministry of Defense escalated its false claims of US and NATO
preparations to attack Belarus while announcing the start of a second stage of ongoing
military exercises on May 10. However, Belarus remains unlikely to join the war in
Ukraine. Belarusian Defense Minister Viktor Khrenin announced the second stage of ongoing rapid
response forces exercises on May 10 in response to what he falsely claimed were NATO escalations.
Belarusian First Deputy Minister of Defense Victor Gulevich accused the US and its allies of building
up a military presence around Belarusian borders and claimed that Poland and the Baltic states are
threatening Belarusian territory through reconnaissance, sabotage, and special operations.
Gulevich
announced that Belarusian battalion tactical groups (BTGs) will subsequently advance to the Western
and Northwestern operational zones as part of a ”whole range of measures aimed at countering possible
threats” in these areas.
Gulevich additionally stated that the presence of 20,000 Ukrainian troops in
Belarus’ Southern Operational District have necessitated a deployment of unspecified Belarusian troops
to three tactical directions near the Ukrainian border, which is consistent with Ukrainian General Staff
reporting that certain Belarusian units have deployed to the Ukraine-Belarus border area for a combat
readiness check.
The rhetoric of threats to Belarus’ borders is not new and was frequently employed by Belarusian
President Alexander Lukashenko in the early stages of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
The Belarusian
exercises, which are concentrated on Belarus’ borders with Poland and the Baltic States rather than
Ukraine, are likely primarily demonstrative and signal Belarus’ continued political support for Russia‘s
war in Ukraine. The exercises are likely additionally intended to draw NATO attention and possibly
disrupt NATO aid to Ukraine, rather than threatening an actual military operation—similar to Russian
efforts to destabilize Moldova that are likely intended to distract Romania and NATO rather than
directly threaten Odesa. Belarus remains unlikely to join the war in Ukraine. Lukashenko successfully
repressed domestic opposition in 2020 and 2021 but remains vulnerable to further domestic unrest if
his security apparatus weakens; he is likely unwilling to risk losing his military in a stalled and
deteriorating Russian war in Ukraine.
Key Takeaways
• The Ukrainian counteroffensive in northern Kharkiv took further ground and have
possibly closed to within 10km of the Russian border.
