1 Institute for the Study of War & AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment
Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan
May 3, 6:45 pm ET
Ukrainian officials reported with increasing confidence that the Kremlin will announce
mobilization on May 9. Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate Chief Kyrylo Budanov said
on May 2 that the Kremlin has begun to prepare mobilization processes and personnel ahead of the
expected May 9 announcement and has already carried out covert mobilization.
This Ukrainian counteroffensive is very unlikely to affect
Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum, as the Russians have not been relying on
GLOCs from Kharkiv to support their operations in Izyum but have been using routes further to the
east and well beyond the most recent Ukrainian counteroffensive’s limit of advance. The Ukrainian
counteroffensive may, however, unhinge the Russian positions northeast of Kharkiv and could set
conditions for a broader operation to drive the Russians from most of their positions around the city.
This possibility may pose a dilemma for the Russians—whether to reinforce their positions near Kharkiv
to prevent such a broader Ukrainian operation or to risk losing most or all of their positions in artillery
range of the city.
Russia’s long-term intentions regarding the status of Mariupol and other occupied areas
seem confused. Some anecdotes from Mariupol indicate that Russia may plan to incorporate
Mariupol and the surrounding environs into the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR), and possibly annex
the DNR to the Russian Federation. Other anecdotes suggest that Russia could directly absorb Mariupol
into Rostov Oblast. These inconsistencies could simply be artifacts of reporting or confusion on the
ground, but they could also indicate actual confusion about Russia’s long-term plans for governing the
Ukrainian regions that Moscow’s forces currently occupy. These anecdotes clearly support the
assessment that Putin has no intention of ceding occupied territories back to an
independent Ukraine and is, at most, considering exactly how he intends to govern
regions that Russia has illegally seized.
Key Takeaways
• Russian forces resumed air, artillery, and ground assaults on the Azovstal Steel
Plant following the conclusion of the May 2 evacuation efforts.
• Russian forces continued to regroup on the Donetsk-Luhansk axis in likely
preparation for a westward advance in the direction of Lyman and Slovyansk.
• The Ukrainian Armed Forces conducted a counteroffensive that likely pushed
Russian forces up to 40 km east of Kharkiv City.
• Russian forces conducted limited ground offensives in Zaporizhia Oblast in the
vicinity of Huliapole and intensified reconnaissance operations in the vicinity of
Odesa amid growing tensions in Transnistria.
