1 Institute for the Study of War & The Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 27
Mason Clark, Kateryna Stepanenko, and George Barros
April 27, 8pm ET
Russian forces made minor but steady advances both from Izyum and in continued
assaults along the line of contact in eastern Ukraine on April 27. Russian forces took several
small towns directly west of Izyum in the past 24 hours. While this line of advance takes Russian
forces away from their main objective of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, they likely intend to outflank
Ukrainian defensive positions on the highways to Barvinkove and Slovyansk. Russian forces made
several small advances in eastern Ukraine; Russia’s increasing concentration of artillery assets is
likely enabling these tactical advances. Russian forces are advancing methodically in several sectors
but have achieved no notable breakthroughs. The capability of Russian forces to encircle large groups
of Ukrainian forces remains in doubt.
The Kremlin continued to prepare for a likely false-flag missile attack against the
Moldovan territory of Transnistria, which is illegally occupied by Russian forces.
Russian proxies in Transnistria falsely claimed Ukrainian forces are preparing to attack Transnistria,
and Ukrainian intelligence reported Russian forces are preparing to conduct a missile strike on
Transnistria and blame Ukraine. Russian and Transnistrian forces also increased their readiness for
possible operations in the last 24 hours. Russia may intend to involve Transnistria in the war in
Ukraine to utilize Transnistria’s (limited) reserve forces or to launch attacks and shell Ukraine from
Transnistrian territory. The Kremlin may alternatively seek to destabilize Moldova itself to raise
tensions in Moldova and neighboring Romania and put additional pressure on NATO, possibly
seeking to reduce Western military support to Ukraine either by diverting NATO forces to Romania or
threatening a wider escalation.
Russian forces are stepping up “filtration measures” in occupied territories and
abducting Ukrainian citizens, likely for use in future prisoner exchanges. Ukraine’s Main
Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on April 27 that Russian forces are conducting large-scale
“filtration measures” in Kharkiv, Zaporizhia, Kherson, Mykolaiv, Luhansk, and Donetsk Oblasts.
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“filtration” targets men of military age, former military and law enforcement personnel, and pro-
Ukrainian activists for interrogation, torture, and possible execution. The GUR reported Russian
forces are additionally shipping Ukrainian hostages to Crimea to “replenish the exchange fund,”
seeking to exchange Ukrainian civilians for Russian military prisoners in future prisoner swaps. The
GUR additionally speculated that Russian forces may be preparing to use Ukrainian civilians to
portray Prisoners of War in May 9th Victory Day celebrations, noting that Russian forces conducted
similar propaganda efforts in Donetsk in 2014.
Ukrainian forces likely conducted drone or possibly missile strikes on Russian logistics
centers in Belgorod and Voronezh on April 27. Russian sources and social media reported
multiple explosions early on April 27, which Ukrainian Presidential Advisor Mikhail Podolyak later
euphemistically confirmed were Ukrainian strikes, stating Russian cities cannot “sit out” the invasion
of Ukraine and “the disarmament of the Belgorod-Voronezh warehouses is a natural process.”
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Ukrainian forces will likely conduct further cross-border strikes to disrupt Russian logistics, which the
Kremlin will likely falsely frame as an escalation or somehow a war crime.
