1 Institute for the Study of War & AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 20
Mason Clark, George Barros, and Karolina Hird
April 20, 6pm ET
Russian forces made minor advances in the ongoing offensive in eastern Ukraine on
April 19, seizing several small towns and advancing into the key frontline towns of
Rubizhne and Popasna. Russian forces continued major assaults with heavy air and artillery
support but are continuing to build the logistics and command-and-control capabilities necessary for a
larger offensive. Russian forces have not achieved any major breakthroughs, nor have they
demonstrated any new capability to conduct multiple successful, simultaneous advances. Russian
forces additionally made grinding progress against remaining Ukrainian defenders in Mariupol’s
Azovstal Steel Works and announced plans for a May 9 Victory Day parade in the city – indicating
Russian forces will declare victory in Mariupol by that date at the latest.
Key Takeaways
• Russia’s offensive in eastern Ukraine secured minor gains in the last 24 hours,
taking parts of the key frontline towns of Rubizhne and Popasna.
• Ukrainian forces reported the presence of small numbers of Syrian or Libyan
mercenaries fighting in Popasna (eastern Ukraine), likely individual recruits
fighting under the umbrella of the Wagner Group rather than larger units.
• Russian forces made incremental advances in Mariupol and continued to set
conditions to declare victory in the city by –at the latest – May 9.
• Russian forces made minor advances around Izyum but have not secured any
major breakthroughs.
Russian forces may be preparing to conscript Ukrainian citizens amid continuing
recruitment challenges. The Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on April 20
that Russian occupation forces are planning to hold pseudo-referendums in occupied Zaporizhia and
Kherson Oblasts to declare a forced mobilization and “throw ‘mobilized’ Ukrainians to the hottest parts
of the front.”[1] If confirmed, this effort is highly unlikely to generate meaningful combat power and
will provoke an uptick in protests and partisan actions against Russian forces in these regions. The GUR
additionally reported that Russia’s FSB is conducting a purge of the political leadership of the LNR in
retaliation for its failure to achieve military objectives since February 24.[2]
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-
covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are
assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of
these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on
combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the
laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not
describe them in these reports.
