1 Institute for the Study of War & AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment
Mason Clark, George Barros, and Kateryna Stepanenko
April 21, 6:45pm ET
The Kremlin declared victory in the battle of Mariupol. Russian forces will attempt to
starve out remaining Ukrainian defenders in the Azovstal Steel Plant rather than clear it
through likely costly assaults. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Defense Minister Sergei
Shoigu declared victory in the battle of Mariupol on April 21 despite the continued presence of
Ukrainian forces in Mariupol’s Azovstal Steel Plant. In a staged, televised meeting, Putin ordered
Shoigu to halt assaults on the plant to limit Russian casualties, claiming Russian forces have already
captured the entirety of the city. The Kremlin will spin the (still incomplete) capture of Mariupol into a
major victory in Ukraine to compensate for stalled or failed Russian offensives elsewhere.
The Kremlin’s reduction of the pace of operations in Mariupol is unlikely to enable the
deployment of significant combat power to support other offensive operations in the
coming days and weeks. Statements from US officials that Russia has not yet removed a dozen
battalion tactical groups (BTGs) from Mariupol despite Putin’s claimed victory do not capture either
the status of these Russian forces or other constraints on their use.
ISW has consistently assessed that
Russian BTGs have taken high casualties in the battle of Mariupol, are degraded, and are unlikely to
possess their full complement of personnel (800-900 at full strength). As with Russian operations
elsewhere in Ukraine, reporting on numbers of BTGs without additional context and analysis of the
combat power of these units is not a useful evaluation of Russian forces. While it is unlikely that all 12
reported BTGs were involved in the final fighting around the Azovstal plant, it will still take some time
for those units that were engaged in final assaults to disengage for redeployment elsewhere. Some
portion of these Russian forces will be necessary for several other missions—including maintaining the
siege of the Azovstal plant, securing the rest of Mariupol against any remaining pockets of Ukrainian
forces and likely partisan actions, and possibly redeploying to support Russian forces maintaining
control of southern Ukraine. Russian forces will certainly be able to redeploy some units
from Mariupol to offensive operations elsewhere—but Ukrainian forces have succeeded
in tying down and degrading a substantial Russian force, and the Kremlin's declaration
of victory has not inherently freed up 12 BTGs worth of combat power for other
operations.
Key Takeaways
• The Kremlin’s declaration of victory in Mariupol is unlikely to enable the
deployment of significant combat power to reinforce offensive operations in
eastern Ukraine in the coming days or weeks.
• Russian forces involved in the battle of Mariupol are likely heavily damaged and
Ukrainian forces succeeded in tying down and degrading a substantial Russian
force.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Ukraine but made only
marginal gains.
• Ukrainian forces continued to halt Russian attacks around Izyum.
