1 Institute for the Study of War & AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment
Frederick W. Kagan, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Karolina Hird
April 16, 5:00 pm ET
Ukraine’s sinking of the Moskva was a significant event that has likely triggered
intensified Russian air and missile attacks in retaliation, but the decisive operations of
this phase of the war will still be conducted on the ground in eastern Ukraine. The
commitment of the Black Sea Fleet’s naval infantry to the fight around Mariupol some weeks ago meant
that Russian naval operations would play a supporting role in the conflict. Increased Russian air and
missile attacks are also unlikely to have a decisive impact on the outcome of the war, since there is no
reason to assess that Russia has been holding enough air and missile capability in reserve to tip the
balance if it is now committed. This report, and likely future reports as well, will thus remain focused
on the ground operations, especially those in eastern Ukraine.
Russian forces continued to amass troops around Izyum in preparation for continuing
offensive operations in eastern Ukraine. The Russians continued small-scale attacks in the
vicinities of Izyum, Popasna, and the area around Rubizhne and Severodonetsk—sometimes with
artillery, sometimes with mechanized forces. These attacks have not made significant gains so far. It is
unclear if they are part of a rolling offensive operation into which Russian reinforcements will be fed as
they become available or if they are setting conditions for a larger-scale, better-coordinated offensive
that will start soon.
The specific terrain on which battles in eastern Ukraine will be fought may constrain the
Russians’ ability to take advantage of the number of forces they are amassing for the
attack. Eastern Ukraine is famous for being superb terrain for large-scale mechanized maneuver
because of the World War II campaigns of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army. It is far from clear,
however, that Russian forces will find it much more conducive to rapid decisive mechanized operations
than other parts of the theater. The Russians have struggled repeatedly to seize built-up areas rapidly
or even to reduce them once encircled. They will have to seize several significant population centers to
achieve their apparent objectives in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, however, including Severodonetsk,
Rubizhne, Lysychansk, Slovyansk, and Kramatorsk, as well as several smaller towns. The difficulties
they have encountered taking Rubizhne do not bode well for their rapid success against other built-up
areas. The ground itself is also challenging as it is crisscrossed by many small water features and, at the
moment, still very muddy. The reinforcements the Russians are bringing into this part of the theater
will help, of course, but large numbers of much fresher Russian troops struggled to take relatively small
population centers north, west, and northeast of Kyiv even before getting into the Kyiv suburbs proper.
The Russians must take the major population centers in Donetsk and Luhansk, however, if they are to
achieve the operation’s stated goals.
Russian forces will likely continue operating along three primary axes of advance in
Donbas: from Izyum south via Slovyansk toward Russian-controlled Donetsk Oblast
near Debaltseve; from Rubizhne and Severodonetsk southwest toward the Izyum-
Debaltseve highway; and from Popasna west toward that highway. They may open an
additional axis of advance from near Donetsk City to the north toward Kramatorsk as
well, according to the Ukrainian General Staff.
