1 Institute for the Study of War & AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment
Mason Clark, George Barros, and Karolina Hird
April 1, 7:00 pm ET
ISW assesses that the Kremlin has revised its campaign plan in Ukraine after the failure
of its initial campaign to capture Kyiv and other major Ukrainian cities and its
subsequent failure to adjust its operations in late March. ISW previously assessed that the
initial Russian campaign of the war—airborne and mechanized operations to seize Kyiv, Kharkiv,
Odesa, and other major Ukrainian cities to force a change of government in Ukraine—had failed as of
March 19.
The Russian military continued to feed small collections of reinforcements into operations
around Kyiv and across northeastern and southern Ukraine in an effort to keep its initial campaign plan
alive throughout late March. We assess that the Russian military has now halted these failed efforts and
is beginning a new phase of its campaign in Ukraine with new objectives. We are updating the structure
of our campaign assessments to reflect the new structure and prioritization of Russian operations.
Russia’s main effort is now focused on eastern Ukraine, with two subordinate main
efforts: capturing the port city of Mariupol and capturing the entirety of Donetsk and
Luhansk Oblasts. The Kremlin claims the entirety of these oblasts as the territory of its proxies in
eastern Ukraine, the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR).
The Kremlin is
increasingly redeploying troops from other axes of advance and channeling its remaining
reinforcements from Russia into eastern Ukraine. Russian forces are unlikely to conduct active
operations on other fronts in the coming weeks.
The Kremlin may intend to capture Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts before seeking to
negotiate a Kremlin-favorable ceasefire and claim that Russia has achieved its war aims.
The Kremlin’s initial false justification for its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine was to protect the DNR
and LNR from Ukraine and enable them to seize their “claimed” territory. The Kremlin is attempting
to gloss over the failure of Russia’s initial campaign for a domestic Russian audience. The Kremlin has
in fact been forced to alter its operations after the failure of its initial campaign. Kremlin claims that
Russian forces solely attacked northeastern Ukraine to degrade Ukrainian forces before
achieving the “main goal” of capturing Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts—such as
statements made by the Russian General Staff on March 25—are false.
Russian forces have three supporting efforts: Kharkiv and Izyum; Kyiv and northeastern
Ukraine; and the southern axis, including Kherson.
• Russian forces on the Kharkiv axis have abandoned efforts to take the city. Their
new objectives are likely to 1) pin Ukrainian mechanized forces in place, and 2)
drive southeast to link up with Russian forces in Luhansk Oblast. Russian forces
captured Izyum (southeast of Kharkiv) on April 1 after attempting to do so since at least March
7.
Russian forces, including elements redeployed from the Sumy axis in the past week, will likely
continue offensive operations in the coming days in an effort to cut off Ukrainian forces on the
line of contact in Donbas.
• Russian forces around Kyiv and in northeastern Ukraine seek to conduct a
retrograde action—the orderly withdrawal of combat forces—for refit and further
redeployment to other axes of advance. Russian forces remaining on the forward trace of
Russian lines are a covering force intended to screen the retrograde of most of the combat power
previously deployed around Kyiv. Ukrainian forces retook substantial territory both northwest
and east of Kyiv in the past 24 hours. Ukrainian forces likely advanced faster than Russian forces
