1 Institute for the Study of War & AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 9
Fredrick W. Kagan, George Barros, and Katya Stepanenko
March 9, 3:00 PM EST
Russian operations to continue the encirclement of and assault on Kyiv have likely
begun, although on a smaller scale and in a more ad hoc manner than ISW expected. The
equivalent of a Russian reinforced brigade reportedly tried to advance toward Kyiv
through its western outskirts and made little progress. Smaller operations continued
slowly to consolidate and gradually to extend the encirclement to the southwest of the
capital. Russian operations in the eastern approaches to Kyiv remain in a lull, likely
because the Russians are focusing on securing the long lines of communication running
to those outskirts from Russian bases around Sumy and Chernihiv in the face of skillful
and determined Ukrainian harassment of those lines. The battle for Kyiv is likely to
continue to be a drawn-out affair unless the Russians can launch a more concentrated
and coherent attack than they have yet shown the ability to conduct.
The Russian military is clearly struggling to mobilize reserve manpower to offset losses and fill out new
units. The Kremlin admitted that conscripts have been fighting in Ukraine (in violation of Russian law)
for the first time on March 9, although in a customarily bizarre fashion: according to the Kremlin,
Vladimir Putin himself discovered that conscripts were operating in Ukraine while he was reviewing a
report on the conflict. The Kremlin says Russian military judicial authorities will reportedly open an
investigation into this practice and punish those responsible.
Putin himself would, of course, ultimately
be responsible for having issued the mobilization orders that sent conscripts to the front. Reports have
also surfaced that students at medical and theater schools were being conscripted in late February,
along with some denials of those reports.
Social media users also flagged the movement of Russian
peacekeeping forces in the Nagorno-Karabakh region, speculating that they may be withdrawing to
participate in the war in Ukraine.
ISW cannot independently verify any of these reports. Their general
tenor, however, aligns with our published assessment that Russia faces challenges in generating a new
wave of combat-effective reservists or recruits in a short period of time and our assessment that Russia
will need such a wave to complete its objectives.
Key Takeaways
• Russian forces have likely begun renewed offensive operations into Kyiv and to
continue its encirclement on the west, but have not made much progress.
• Russian troops east of the Dnipro near Kyiv are likely attempting to consolidate
their lines of communication against significant Ukrainian counter-attacks and
disruption to set conditions for attacking the capital from the east.
• Russia is unlikely to attempt to seize Kharkiv through a ground offensive in the
coming days, but will probably continue efforts to encircle and/or bypass it.
• Russian and Russian proxy forces in Donetsk and Luhansk are driving to gain
control of the full territorial extent of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, but have not
yet done so.
• Mariupol remains encircled and under bombardment.
• Russian forces continue to prepare for operations against Zaporizhya City but have
not yet initiated them at scale.
• Russian forces from Kherson appear to be encircling Mykolayiv from the east but
have not yet crossed the Southern Bug River. Russian operations against Odesa are
unlikely to commence before Russia establishes a secure line of control from
Crimea across the Southern Bug.
