1 Institute for the Study of War & The Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 27, 2022
Mason Clark, George Barros, and Katya Stepanenko
February 27, 4pm EST
The Russian military has likely recognized that its initial expectations that limited Russian
attacks would cause the collapse of Ukrainian resistance have failed and is recalibrating
accordingly. The Russian military is moving additional combat resources toward Ukraine and establishing
more reliable and effective logistics arrangements to support what is likely a larger, harder, and more
protracted conflict than it had originally prepared for. The tide of the war could change rapidly in Russia’s favor
if the Russian military has correctly identified its failings and addresses them promptly, given the
overwhelming advantage in net combat power Moscow enjoys. Ukrainian morale and combat effectiveness
remain extremely high, however, and Russian forces confront the challenge of likely intense urban warfare in
the coming days.
Russian forces largely conducted an operational pause on February 26-27 but will likely resume
offensive operations and begin using greater air and artillery support in the coming days.
Russian airborne and special forces troops are engaged in urban warfare in northwestern Kyiv, but Russian
mechanized forces are not yet in the capital. Russian forces conducted limited attacks on the direct approaches
to Kyiv on both banks of the Dnipro River, but largely paused offensive operations in northeastern Ukraine.
Russian forces likely paused to recalibrate their – to date largely unsuccessful – approach to offensive
operations in northern Ukraine and deploy additional reinforcements and air assets to the front lines.
Russian forces from Crimea slowly pushed north toward Zaporizhie and the southeastern bend of the Dnipro
River and east along the Azov Sea coast toward Mariupol on February 27. Russian forces advancing east from
Crimea began initial assaults against Mariupol the morning of February 27. These advances risk cutting off the
large concentrations of Ukrainian forces still defending the former line of contact between unoccupied Ukraine
and occupied Donbas.
Ukrainian resistance remains remarkably effective and Russian operations especially on the Kyiv axis have
been poorly coordinated and executed, leading to significant Russian failures on that axis and at Kharkiv.
Russian forces remain much larger and more capable than Ukraine’s conventional military, however, and
Russian advances in southern Ukraine may threaten to unhinge the defense of Kyiv and northeastern Ukraine
if they continue unchecked.
KTs
• Russian forces likely conducted an operational pause on the Kyiv axis on February 26-27
to deploy additional supplies and forces forward. Russian forces will likely resume
offensive operations against Kyiv in the next 24 hours. Russian troops have not yet
