1 Institute for the Study of War & AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2020
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 17
Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, Angela Howard, and Frederick W. Kagan
September 17, 9:30 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Russian forces continue to conduct meaningless offensive operations around Donetsk
City and Bakhmut instead of focusing on defending against Ukrainian counteroffensives
that continue to advance. Russian troops continue to attack Bakhmut and various villages near
Donetsk City of emotional significance to pro-war residents of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR)
but little other importance. The Russians are apparently directing some of the very limited reserves
available in Ukraine to these efforts rather than to the vulnerable Russian defensive lines hastily thrown
up along the Oskil River in eastern Kharkiv Oblast. The Russians cannot hope to make gains around
Bakhmut or Donetsk City on a large enough scale to derail Ukrainian counteroffensives and appear to
be continuing an almost robotic effort to gain ground in Donetsk Oblast that seems increasingly
divorced from the overall realities of the theater.
Russian failures to rush large-scale reinforcements to eastern Kharkiv and to Luhansk
Oblasts leave most of Russian-occupied northeastern Ukraine highly vulnerable to
continuing Ukrainian counter-offensives. The Russians may have decided not to defend this
area, despite Russian President Vladimir Putin’s repeated declarations that the purpose of the “special
military operation” is to “liberate” Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Prioritizing the defense of Russian
gains in southern Ukraine over holding northeastern Ukraine makes strategic sense since Kherson and
Zaporizhia Oblasts are critical terrain for both Russia and Ukraine whereas the sparsely-populated
agricultural areas in the northeast are much less so. But the continued Russian offensive operations
around Bakhmut and Donetsk City, which are using some of Russia’s very limited effective combat
power at the expense of defending against Ukrainian counteroffensives, might indicate that Russian
theater decision-making remains questionable.
Ukrainian forces appear to be expanding positions east of the Oskil River and north of
the Siverskyi Donets River that could allow them to envelop Russian troops holding
around Lyman. Further Ukrainian advances east along the north bank of the Siverskyi Donets River
could make Russian positions around Lyman untenable and open the approaches to Lysychansk and
ultimately Severodonetsk. The Russian defenders in Lyman still appear to consist in large part of BARS
(Russian Combat Army Reserve) reservists and the remnants of units badly damaged in the Kharkiv
Oblast counteroffensive, and the Russians do not appear to be directing reinforcements from elsewhere
in the theater to these areas.
Key Takeaways
• Russian forces continue to prioritize strategically meaningless offensive
operations around Donetsk City and Bakhmut over defending against continued
Ukrainian counter-offensive operations in Kharkiv Oblast.
• Ukrainian forces liberated a settlement southwest of Lyman and are likely
continuing to expand their positions in the area.
• Ukrainian forces continued to conduct an interdiction campaign in Kherson
Oblast.
• Russian forces continued to conduct unsuccessful assaults around Bakhmut and
Avdiivka.
