1 Institute for the Study of War & AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 18
Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, and Frederick W. Kagan
September 18, 9:35 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Russian President Vladimir Putin is increasingly relying on irregular volunteer and
proxy forces rather than conventional units and formations of the Russian Federation
Armed Forces. ISW has previously reported that Putin has been bypassing the Russian higher
military command and Ministry of Defense leadership throughout the summer and especially following
the defeat around Kharkiv Oblast.
Putin’s souring relationship with the military command and the
Russian (MoD) may explain in part the Kremlin’s increasing focus on recruiting ill-prepared volunteers
into ad-hoc irregular units rather than attempting to draw them into reserve or replacement pools for
regular Russian combat units.
A prominent Russian milblogger reported that Russian forces have “already began the process of
forming and staffing the 4th Army Corps, at least on a documentation level.”
The report may be true
given the recent Russia-wide push for the formation of more regional volunteer units among the
Kremlin representatives following the Russian defeat around Kharkiv Oblast.
Russian federal subjects
had previously begun advertising for contract service in volunteer units around the time of the
formation of the 3rd Army Corps.
Russian forces are also increasingly recruiting prisoners, involving
Cossack units, deploying elements of Russian security services such as the Russian Federal Security
Service and Rosgvardia, and covertly mobilizing men from occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. The
continued focus on the formation of irregular units is receiving some criticism from retired Russian
officers who are calling for proper conventional divisions rather than volunteer battalions.
The formation of such ad-hoc units will lead to further tensions, inequality, and an
overall lack of cohesiveness between forces. Ukrainian and Russian sources have reported
instances of Russian Armed Forces refusing to pay veteran benefits, one-time enlistment bonuses, or
provide medical treatment to BARS (Russian Combat Army Reserve) servicemen.
Some military
formations offer financial incentives for every kilometer that the serviceman’s unit advances, an
incentive that few soldiers will likely benefit from considering that Russian forces are on the defensive
almost everywhere apart from the areas around Bakhmut and Donetsk City, where gains have been slow
and very limited.
Russian opposition publication Insider reported instances of ethnic discrimination
within Chechen units, noting that the Chechen leadership deploys non-Chechens to the frontlines
before committing Chechens to the battle.
Professional military staff are likely to confront behavioral
issues among recruited prisoners, especially considering the likely prevalence of prisoners convicted of
violent crimes, narcotics, and rape. The Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republics (LNR and DNR) have
both previously refused to fight for each other’s territory.
All these groups have different levels of
military training, decentralized command structures, and different perceptions of the war and
motivations to fight, which makes conflict and poor unit coordination more probable. The one thing
they have in common is wholly inadequate training and preparation for combat.
The formation of irregular, hastily-trained units adds little effective combat power to
Russian forces fighting in Ukraine. Forbes noted that the 3rd Army Corps rushed in to defend
Russian positions around Kharkiv Oblast during the counteroffensive but failed to make any difference
and “melted away.”
The reported arrival of increasing numbers of irregular Russian forces on the
battlefield has had little to no impact on Russian operations.
