1 Institute for the Study of War & AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 15
Kateryna Stepanenko, Katherine Lawlor, Grace Mappes, George Barros, and Frederick
W. Kagan
September 15, 9:30 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Ukrainian forces are continuing counteroffensive operations in eastern Ukraine,
increasingly pressuring Russian positions and logistics lines in eastern Kharkiv,
northern Luhansk, and eastern Donetsk oblasts. Russian sources reported that Ukrainian
forces are continuing ground operations southeast of Izyum, near Lyman, and on the east bank of the
Oskil River, reportedly compelling Russian forces to withdraw from some areas in eastern Ukraine and
reinforce others.
Russian forces in eastern Ukraine will likely struggle to hold their defensive lines if
Ukrainian forces continue to push farther east.
The Kremlin is responding to the defeat around Kharkiv Oblast by doubling down on
crypto-mobilization rather than setting conditions for general mobilization. Chechen
leader Ramzan Kadyrov called on all federal subjects to initiate “self-mobilization” and not wait on the
Kremlin to declare martial law.
Kadyrov claimed that each federal subject must prove its readiness to
help Russia by recruiting at least 1,000 servicemen instead of delivering speeches and conducting
fruitless public events. Russian propagandist Margarita Simonyan echoed the need for Russians to
volunteer to join the war effort, and several loyalist Russian governors publicly supported Kadyrov’s
speech.
The Russian-appointed head of occupied Crimea, Sergey Aksyonov, announced the formation
of two volunteer battalions on the peninsula in support of Kadyrov’s calls.
The defeat around Kharkiv Oblast prompted the Kremlin to announce a Russia-wide
recruitment campaign. Kremlin officials and state media had not previously made country-wide
recruitment calls but had instead tasked local officials and outlets to generate forces ostensibly on their
own initiative. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov vaguely welcomed the creation of the battalions
on July 12, while 47 loyalist federal subjects advertised and funded the regional volunteer battalion
recruitment campaign.
A prominent Russian milblogger and a supporter of general mobilization
praised officials such as Kadyrov for taking the recruitment campaign from the ineffective Russian
Ministry of Defense; this recruitment revamp is likely to secure more support for the Kremlin among
nationalist figures who are increasingly critical of the Russian MoD, even if the drive does not generate
large numbers of combat-effective troops.
The Kremlin has likely abandoned its efforts to shield select federal subjects from
recruitment drives, which may increase social tensions. ISW has previously reported that the
Kremlin attempted to shield Moscow City residents from reports of the formation of the Moscow-based
“Sobyaninsky Polk” volunteer regiment.
Russian opposition outlet The Insider noted that several
groups in the republics of Buryatia, Kalmykia, Tyva, and Yakytia (Republic of Sakha) are publicly
opposed to the Kremlin's emphasis on recruitment on an ethnic basis.
Simonyan’s statement about
“self-mobilization” prompted numerous negative comments among Russians calling on Russian
oligarchs to pay for and fight in the war.
The Kremlin has almost certainly drained a large proportion of the forces originally
stationed in Russian bases in former Soviet states since Russia’s full-scale invasion of
Ukraine began in February, likely weakening Russian influence in those states. A Radio
Free Europe / Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) investigation reported on September 14 that the Russian
