1 Institute for the Study of War & The Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 14
Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, Katherine Lawlor,
George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan
September 14, 8:15pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is being established as the face of the
Russian “special military operation” in Ukraine. Prigozhin gave a recruitment speech on
September 14 announcing that Russian prisoners have been participating in the war since July 1 when
they were instrumental in seizing the Vuhlehirska Thermal Power Plant.
1
A Russian milblogger noted
that Prigozhin is introducing a “Stalinist” method that allows the Kremlin to avoid ordering a general
mobilization that could ignite social tensions in Russian society.
2
Milbloggers have been consistently
praising Prigozhin’s success in Ukraine and some even said that he should replace the Russian Defense
Minister Sergey Shoigu, whom milbloggers and Kremlin pundits blame for the Russian defeat around
Kharkiv Oblast.
3
Russian military correspondent and milblogger Maksim Fomin (alias Vladlen
Tatarsky) claimed to have spoken to Prigozhin about the situation on the Ukrainian-Russian border
after the withdrawal of Russian forces in the area.
4
The Prigozhin-Fomin meeting, if it occurred, could
indicate that the Kremlin is attempting to address milbloggers’ months-long complaints that the
Russian Defense Ministry did not hear their criticism highlighting the ineffectiveness of Russian higher
command. Prigozhin is Putin’s close confidant, and his developing relationship with milbloggers may
help retain milblogger support for the Kremlin’s war effort while scapegoating Shoigu and the Russian
Defense Ministry for the defeat around Kharkiv Oblast. ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin has
changed its information approach to address the demands of the Russian milbloggers and nationalists’,
suggesting that Putin seeks to win back the critical milblogger community alienated by Russian
failures.
5
Russian forces likely targeted Ukrainian hydrotechnical infrastructure in western
Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on September 14 to interfere with Ukrainian operations across
the Inhulets River. Ukrainian sources reported that eight Russian cruise missiles struck unspecified
targets in Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and caused extensive flooding in areas of Kryvyi Rih.
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Russian sources identified the target location as the Karachun Dam, which sits along the Inhulets River
on the western outskirts of Kryvyi Rih.
7
Footage of the aftermath of the strike shows a 2.5m increase in
the water level of the Inhulets River, which runs south of Kryvyi Rih and is an important geographical
feature for the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive along the Kherson-Mykolaiv border.
8
Russian
forces likely targeted the Karachun Dam to damage Ukrainian pontoon bridges further downstream,
especially in light of recent reports that Ukrainian troops are attempting to expand their bridgehead
over the Inhulets River near Davydiv Brid as part of the ongoing Kherson counteroffensive.
9
Key Takeaways
Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is being established as the face of the
Russian “special military operation” in Ukraine.
