1 Institute for the Study of War & AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 13
Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, Katherine Lawlor, George Barros, and Frederick
W. Kagan
September 13, 10:15 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
The Kremlin acknowledged its defeat in Kharkiv Oblast, the first time Moscow has openly
recognized a defeat since the start of the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Kremlin
officials and state media propagandists are extensively discussing the reasons for the Russian defeat in
Kharkiv Oblast, a marked change from their previous pattern of reporting on exaggerated or fabricated
Russian successes with limited detail.
The Kremlin never admitted that Russia was defeated around
Kyiv or, later, at Snake Island, framing the retreat from Kyiv as a decision to prioritize the “liberation”
of Donbas and the withdrawal from Snake Island as a “gesture of goodwill.”
The Russian Ministry of
Defense (MoD) originally offered a similar explanation for the Russian failure in Kharkiv, claiming that
Russian forces were withdrawing troops from Kharkiv Oblast to regroup, but this false narrative faced
quick and loud criticism online.
The Kremlin’s acknowledgment of the defeat is part of an effort to
mitigate and deflect criticism for such a devastating failure away from Russian President Vladimir Putin
and onto the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the uniformed military command.
Kremlin sources are now working to clear Putin of any responsibility for the defeat,
instead blaming the loss of almost all of occupied Kharkiv Oblast on underinformed
military advisors within Putin’s circle.
One member of the Kremlin’s Council for Interethnic
Relations, Bogdan Bezpalko, even stated that military officials who had failed to see the concentration
of Ukrainian troops and equipment and disregarded Telegram channels that warned of the imminent
Ukrainian counter-offensive in Kharkiv Oblast should have their heads ”lying on Putin’s desk.”
ISW
has previously reported that the Kremlin delayed Putin‘s meeting with Russian defense officials
immediately after the withdrawal of troops from around Kharkiv, increasing the appearance of a rift
between the Kremlin and the Russian MoD.
The Kremlin’s admission of defeat in Kharkiv shows that
Putin is willing and able to recognize and even accept a Russian defeat at least in some circumstances
and focus on deflecting blame from himself.
Several members of the Russian State Duma expressed concern about the dire situation
on the frontlines in Ukraine during the Duma’s first plenary meeting of its autumn
session on September 13. Leader of the Russian Communist Party Gennady Zyuganov stated that
Russia needs to announce full mobilization because the Russian “special military operation” is a war.
Zyuganov said that one can end a “special military operation” at any time, but that a war can end only
in victory or defeat, and “we have no right to lose” this war. Leader of the “Fair Russia—For Truth”
Party Sergey Mironov called for social “mobilization,” in which regular Russians would pay attention
more to the war in Ukraine, rather than for full military mobilization. Leader of the Russian Liberal
Democratic Party Leonid Slutsky also noted that Russia will continue to fight in the geopolitical “scrum”
with the West. All three MPs had publicly advocated for Putin to recognize the independence of the
Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR) before the February invasion and were
instrumental in setting information conditions for the invasion itself.
The MPs also discussed a
December date for the next hearing on a bill that will simplify the delivery of the semiannual
conscription notices.
The bill, which is likely to pass, will allow Russian military recruitment centers
