1 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment,
September 12
Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Katherine Lawlor, George Barros, and Frederick W.
Kagan
September 12, 8:45 ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Ukraine’s southern counteroffensive is continuing to have significant impacts on
Russian morale and military capabilities in southern Ukraine. Satellite imagery of known
Russian positions in Kyselivka, 15km northwest of Kherson City, shows that all but four Russian
vehicles have departed from previous forward positions, consistent with rumors that Donetsk People’s
Republic (DNR) troops have abandoned Kyselivka and moved back towards the Dnipro
River.[1] Kyselivka is an operationally significant location for Russian forces around Kherson City
because it is the last major settlement along both the E58 highway and a railway line between current
Ukrainian positions and Chornobaivka, the outermost part of Kherson City. The apparent withdrawal
of Russian troops from this position may compromise the Russians’ ability to defend the
northwestern outskirts of Kherson City and suggests that Russian troops in this area perceive an
imminent threat to their positions. Spokesperson for Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command,
Natalya Humenyuk, stated on September 12 that Russian forces located along the right bank of the
Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast are attempting to negotiate for surrender under the auspices of
international law.[2] Ukrainian operations in Kharkiv Oblast are unlikely to have had such a dramatic
psychological effect on Russian troops this far south, and both the withdrawal of troops from forward
positions in Kyselivka and reports of surrender negotiations are indicators that Ukrainian
counteroffensives in the south are progressing in a significant way, even if visibility on this axis is
limited by the shift in focus to Kharkiv.
The success of recent Ukrainian counteroffensive operations may be impacting the will
or ability of the Russian military command to use newly formed volunteer units in
Ukraine in a timely fashion. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Russian military
command has suspended sending new, already-formed units to Ukraine due to recent Russian losses
and widespread distrust of the Russian military command, factors which have caused a large number
of volunteers to categorically refuse to participate in combat.[3] This assessment is still unconfirmed,
but low morale due to Ukrainian counteroffensive success may prove devastating to the Kremlin’s
already-poor ability to generate meaningful combat capability. The deployment of these newly formed
units to reinforce defensive lines against Ukrainian counteroffensives would be an operationally-
sound decision on the part of Russian military leadership; and the delay or potential suspension of
these deployments will afford Ukrainian troops time to consolidate and then resume the offensive,
should they choose to do so, without having to face newly arrived and fresh (albeit undertrained and
understrength) units.
