1 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 8
Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, George Barros, Layne Philipson, and Mason
Clark
September 8, 11:00 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Ukrainian successes on the Kharkiv City-Izyum line are creating fissures within the
Russian information space and eroding confidence in Russian command to a degree not
seen since a failed Russian river crossing in mid-May. Ukrainian military officials announced
that Ukrainian forces advanced 50km deep into Russian defensive positions north of Izyum on
September 8, but the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) notably did not issue any statement regarding
Ukrainian advances in Kharkiv Oblast.
Ukrainian successes and the Russian MoD’s silence prompted
many Russian milbloggers to criticize and debate Russian failures to retain control over the city of
Balakliya, approximately 44km northwest of Izyum. Some milbloggers claimed that Russian forces fully
or partially withdrew from Balakliya in good order, while others complained that Ukrainian forces beat
Russian forces out of the settlement.
Others noted that Rosgvardia units operating in the area did not
coordinate their defenses or have sufficient artillery capabilities to prevent Ukrainian counterattacks in
the region.
Milbloggers warned about an impending Ukrainian counteroffensive northwest of Izyum
for days prior to Ukrainian advances, and some milbloggers noted that Russian command failed to
prepare for “obvious and predictable” Ukrainian counteroffensives.
Others noted that Ukrainian forces
have “completely outplayed” the Russian military command in Balakliya, while others encouraged
readers to wait to discuss Russian losses and withhold criticism until Russian forces stabilize the
frontlines.
The current tone and scale of Russian milblogger criticism echo the response to Russia’s
loss of a large amount of armor in a failed Russian river crossing in Bilohorivka, Luhansk
Oblast, in May.
ISW assessed at the time that the catastrophic Russian losses suffered due to
incompetence shook the confidence of pro-Russian milbloggers, sparking criticism of the Russian war
effort. Russian milbloggers and social media users accessed satellite imagery that showed devastating
losses of Russian military equipment, which caused many to comment on the incompetence of the
Russian military and analyze the scene on a tactical level. The Russian MoD did not comment on the
situation, fueling burgeoning doubts about Russia’s prospects in Ukraine.
The Russian MoD repeated its Bilohorivka information mistake by failing to
acknowledge the situation around Kharkiv Oblast and establish a desired narrative,
leaving milbloggers to fill this gap with criticism of Russian forces. The Russian MoD only
claimed to have destroyed a Ukrainian ammunition depot in Balakliya.
Some milbloggers complained
that the Russian MoD did not seize the information space in a timely manner to prevent the spread of
Ukrainian social media on Russian Telegram channels, leading to distrust among Russian audiences.
Milbloggers largely supported the Russian MoD’s narratives that the Ukrainian counteroffensive in
Kherson Oblast had completely failed just days prior to Ukrainian breakthroughs in Kharkiv Oblast.
Such a shift in milblogger perceptions of Russian progress in Ukraine can be partially attributed to the
flaws in the Russian war-time information strategy, namely that:
1. The Russian MoD struggles to address unexpected Ukrainian operations because its information
strategy relies on portraying the Russian invasion of Ukraine as an easy and faultless operation.
This promotes a lack of situational awareness within the Kremlin and the Russian media space.
