1 Institute for the Study of War & AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 6
Karolina Hird, George Barros, Layne Philipson, and Frederick W. Kagan
September 6, 10:00 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
The International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) September 6 report on the situation at
the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) described numerous ways in which
Russian occupation authorities and the Russian military are jeopardizing the safe
operation of the plant.
The report does not attempt to determine which party is responsible for the
shelling that has damaged the facility and repeatedly calls on “all relevant parties” to take measures to
improve the situation. The moderation and apparent neutrality of that language can overshadow the
extremely clear articulation of the Russian activities undermining the plant’s safety and the fact that
the report attributes no dangerous actions to Ukraine. The IAEA’s report is thus a coded
condemnation of Russian moves that have created and are perpetuating the danger of
nuclear disaster in Ukraine.
The report specifically notes that Ukraine reported to the IAEA that Russian forces had positioned
military equipment in two turbine halls and various other facilities in and around the ZNPP.
It adds
that the inspection team that finally visited the plant recently directly observed Russian military
equipment in turbine halls and elsewhere around the plant.
It added that personnel from Russia’s state
atomic energy organization, ROSATOM, were at the site and observed that “the presence of Rosatom
senior technical staff could lead to interference with the normal lines of operational command or
authority and create potential frictions when it comes to decision-making.”
It also noted that “the
operating staff did not have unrestricted access to some areas, such as the spray cooling ponds, roofs of
the buildings, and structures in the area of the water intake, and that access to the cooling ponds area
was required to be granted by the military personnel at the site.”
The IAEA’s inspection team was told
that “the on-site emergency centre was not accessible to the plant staff for emergency response as it was
occupied by the military authority.” The team visited the alternative emergency center and observed
that it lacked “an independent power supply or an independent ventilation system, and there is no
internet connection to enable effective communication with all parties involved in an emergency
response.”
The IAEA report thus demonstrates that Russian officials have placed military equipment in locations
inhibiting access to essential facilities, installed their own personnel to oversee the plant’s operati ons
in ways that the IAEA judges could undermine effective response to a nuclear emergency, restricted the
Ukrainian operating staff’s access to key parts of the facility, and shifted the emergency center to a
location lacking essential components vital to an effective response to a serious nuclear emergency. The
Russians have thus created conditions at the ZNPP that increase the risk that an
emergency could occur and significantly increase the danger that the operating staff will
be unable to respond efficiently and effectively in such an event.
Russian President Vladimir Putin could seek to use the fears that his actions are causing
to coerce the IAEA and the international community into a de facto recognition of
Russia’s right to be involved in the operation of the ZNPP, which he might seek to portray
as de facto recognition of Russia’s occupation of southern Ukraine. The somewhat coded
language of the IAEA report reflects the fact that Ukraine remains the operator of the ZNPP and the
party responsible for its safe operation and for complying with the IAEA under international law. The
IAEA cannot directly engage Russia regarding the plant’s operation without at least tacitly admitting
