1 Institute for the Study of War & AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 5
Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, Angela Howard, and Mason Clark
September 5, 10:30pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
The Ukrainian counteroffensive is tangibly degrading Russian logistics and
administrative capabilities in occupied southern Ukraine. As ISW has previously reported,
Ukrainian officials explicitly confirmed that Ukrainian troops seek to attrit Russian logistical
capabilities in the south through precision strikes on manpower and equipment concentrations,
command centers, and logistics nodes.
These counteroffensive actions also have intentional radiating
effects on Russian occupation authorities. The head of the Kherson Oblast occupation regime, Kirill
Stremousov, told Russian media outlet TASS that his administration has paused annexation
referendum plans in Kherson Oblast due to “security” concerns.
The Ukrainian Resistance Center
similarly reported that Russian occupation authorities are abandoning plans for referenda due to the
ongoing counteroffensive.
Shortly after TASS published his comment, Stremousov posted on Telegram
denying he called for a pause because his administration had never set an official date for the
referendum.
Both of Stremousov’s statements indicate a high level of disorganization within
occupation regimes that is likely being exacerbated by the effects of the counteroffensive. Ukrainian
forces intend to slowly chip away at both Russian tactical and operational level capabilities in Kherson
Oblast, and in doing so will likely have significant impacts on the administrative and bureaucratic
capabilities of occupation officials.
Putin publicly praised DNR and LNR forces (and denigrated the Russian military) on
September 5, likely to motivate proxy recruitment and reframe Russian coverage of the
war. Russian President Vladimir Putin stated on September 5 that personnel in the 1st and 2nd Army
Corps (the armed forces of the DNR and LNR) are fighting better in Donbas than professional Russian
soldiers and insinuated that he is unhappy with the performance of the Russian Ministry of Defense.
Putin’s comments are likely intended to promote recruitment and force generation in the DNR and
LNR and refocus coverage of the war in the Russian media space away from the fighting in southern
Ukraine. Russian forces have increasingly relied on DNR and LNR personnel as core fighting forces,
and the Kremlin likely seeks to rhetorically elevate their role in the war to enhance recruitment and
increase morale. Putin additionally likely seeks to elevate the Kremlin’s preferred (and false) narrative
of its invasion of Ukraine as an effort to “protect” the DNR and LNR by praising their forces.
Key Takeaways
• The Ukrainian counteroffensive is tangibly degrading Russian logistics and
administrative capabilities in occupied southern Ukraine.
• Putin publicly praised DNR and LNR forces (and denigrated the Russian military)
on September 5, likely to motivate proxy recruitment and reframe Russian
coverage of the war.
• Ukrainian military officials maintained their operational silence regarding the
progress of the Ukrainian counteroffensive but reported on the further
destruction of Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in Central
Kherson Oblast.
• Russian forces conducted ground attacks east of Siversk, northeast and south of
Bakhmut, and along the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City.
• Ukrainian special forces conducted a limited operation against a Russian FSB base
in the Enerhodar area.
