1 Institute for the Study of War & AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 3
Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Angela Howard, George Barros, and Mason Clark
September 3, 8:00 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Ukrainian officials directly stated on September 3 that the ongoing Ukrainian
counteroffensive in southern Ukraine is an intentionally methodical operation to
degrade Russian forces and logistics, rather than one aimed at immediately recapturing
large swathes of territory. Ukrainian Presidential Advisor Oleksiy Arestovych told the Wall Street
Journal on September 3 that the current goal of Ukrainian forces in the south is the “systemic grinding
of Putin’s army and that Ukrainian troops are slowly and systematically uncovering and destroying
Russia’s operational logistical supply system with artillery and precision weapon strikes.
Arestovych’s
statement echoes ISW’s assessment that the ongoing counteroffensive will likely not result in
immediate gains and that Ukrainian forces seek to disrupt key logistics nodes that support Russian
operations in the south and chip away at Russian military capabilities.
The Kremlin could intensify its efforts to promote self-censorship among Russian
milbloggers and war correspondents who cover the war in Ukraine. Russian authorities
arrested and later released prominent Russian milblogger Semyon Pegov (employed by Telegram
channel WarGonzo) in Moscow on September 2, due to what WarGonzo described as Pegov drunkenly
threatening a hotel administrator.
Pegov is an experienced military journalist and WarGonzo has
extensive links to the Russian military and access to Russian military operations in Donbas in 2014,
Syria in 2015, and Ukraine in 2022.
ISW continues to track anomalous activity regarding Russia's
milbloggers. We cannot confirm the circumstances of Pegov’s arrest, but WarGonzo’s explanation may
be correct.
However, ISW previously assessed in July that the Kremlin seeks to promote self-censorship among
milbloggers who have undermined Kremlin efforts to portray the war in Ukraine as a decisive Russian
victory, and the Kremlin may seek to amplify this censorship. Russian military bloggers have candidly
reported on Russian forces‘ poor performance in Ukraine and have discussed how the Kremlin has
attempted to censor their coverage in Ukraine.
Prominent milblogger Rybar noted that the relationship
between the Russian military command and war correspondents particularly soured after Russian
President Vladimir Putin met with war correspondents during the St. Petersburg Economic Forum on
June 17, during which Putin likely tried to defuse milbloggers’ discontent.
The Kremlin later likely
intensified efforts to promote self-censorship among milbloggers by using a leaked letter from mothers
of Russian soldiers who demanded the ban of journalist activity on the frontlines in July.
The Kremlin so far has not escalated to detaining milbloggers for their coverage. Pegov’s arrest—if
connected to his coverage in Ukraine—would be a significant development in Russian efforts to control
the Russian information space. ISW forecasted that the Russian information space would change
significantly if the Ministry of Defense cracked down on milbloggers and stopped them from
operational reporting since ISW uses milbloggers and Russian war correspondents as sources of
Russian claims on a daily basis.
We will continue to observe and report on milblogger and war
correspondent behavior and will flag significant changes in the Russian information space as we
observe them.
Key Takeaways
