1 Institute for the Study of War & The Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 30
Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, George Barros, Grace
Mappes, and Frederick W. Kagan
August 30, 10:30 pm ET
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Ukrainian forces began striking Russian pontoon ferries across the Dnipro River on
August 29, which is consistent with the start of the Ukrainian counteroffensive. The
effects of destroying ferries will likely be more ephemeral than those of putting bridges
out of commission, so attacking them makes sense in conjunction with active ground
operations. Ukrainian military officials confirmed that Ukrainian forces destroyed a Russian
pontoon-ferry crossing in Lvove, approximately 16km west of Nova Kakhovka on the right bank of the
Dnipro River on August 29.
1
Ukrainian and Russian sources have also reported that Ukrainian forces
struck a pontoon crossing constructed out of barges near the Antonivsky Road Bridge.
2
Ukrainian forces have long undertaken efforts to destroy Russian ground lines of
communication (GLOCs) prior to the announcement of the counteroffensive operation,
which likely indicates that Ukrainian forces are committed to a long-term effort -
composed of both strikes and ground assaults. Ukrainian strikes on Russian GLOCs disrupt the
Russians’ ability to supply and reinforce their positions with manpower and equipment, which will
assist Ukrainian ground counteroffensives. Satellite imagery shows that Russian forces are continuing
to use ferries to transfer a limited amount of military equipment daily via the Dnipro River.
3
The Ukrainian counteroffensive is thus a cohesive process that will require some time to
correctly execute. The Kremlin will likely exploit the lack of immediate victory over Kherson City or
Ukrainian operational silence on the progress of the Ukrainian counteroffensive to misrepresent
Ukrainian efforts as failing and to undermine public confidence in its prospects.
Russian forces are continuing to react and adjust their positions throughout southern
Ukraine, likely both as a response to the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive and in
preparation for broader Ukrainian counter-offensives further east. Russian forces are
continuing to transfer large convoys of military equipment from Crimea and Melitopol.
4
Melitopol
Mayor Ivan Fedorov also noted that Russian forces have opened up around five military bases and
barracks in Melitopol and will likely continue to prepare defenses around Melitopol given its
strategically vital GLOCs between Rostov Oblast and southern Ukraine.
5
The Ukrainian Southern
Operational Command reported that Russian forces in Kherson Oblast are attempting to conduct
rotations of troops, likely in an effort to reinforce some vulnerable positions.
6
The Ukrainian counteroffensive is likely driving Russian redeployment and
reprioritization throughout the theater. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian
forces are reinforcing the grouping of forces operating west of Donetsk City area with elements of the
Central Military District (CMD).
7
ISW has previously identified that CMD units, under the command
of the CMD Commander Colonel General Aleksandr Lapin, operated in the Lysychansk-Siversk area
and recently concluded an operational pause in mid-August.
8
The movement of CMD units to Donetsk
