1 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 27
Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan
August 27, 7:30ET
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
The volunteer battalions constituting Russia’s 3
rd
Army Corps will likely deploy to
Ukraine in ad hoc combined arms units to renew offensive operations, possibly on the
Donetsk City axis and the Southern Axis. The volunteer battalions Russia has been forming have
been divided into two general groups, as ISW has previously reported. Some battalions are deploying
to the front lines as soon as they have completed their abbreviated initial training. Others have been
coalescing into a new 3rd Army Corps.
An analysis by Janes Intelligence Group of new images from
combat training for elements of the 3
rd
Army Corps at the Mulino Training Ground in Nizhny
Novogorod found 3
rd
Army Corps troops training with more modern Russian equipment such as BMP-
3 infantry fighting vehicles, T-80BVM and T-90M tanks, and the latest AK-12 assault rifle variants.
The other Russian volunteer battalions that have fought in Ukraine, such as the North Ossetian “Alania”
Battalion, have entered combat with older equipment. The fact that the 3rd Army Corps units are
training on better gear and apparently being held back to deploy in more coherent combined arms
groups suggests that the Russian military intends to commit them to offensive operations and hopes to
regain momentum somewhere along the front line. Elements of the 3rd Army Corps are reportedly
already deploying from Nizhny Novgorod closer towards Russia’s border with Ukraine. The Georgia-
based Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT) observed T-80BV and T-90M tanks that were in Mulino likely
of the 3rd Army Corps deploy to Rostov Oblast on August 27.
If this report is correct, it could suggest
that the Russian military intends to commit the 3rd Army Corps to reinforce offensive operations near
Donetsk City, where drives around Mariinka, Pisky, and Avdiivka have been stalling after making some
gains. Elements of the 3rd Army Corps may also deploy to the Southern Axis. A Russian Local media
outlet reported that the Khabarovsk Krai “Baron Korf” signals battalion will support the deployment of
Russian field posts in Kherson Oblast and provide command and control to the new Russian 3rd Army
Corps, indicating the Kremlin will likely deploy 3rd Army Corps elements to Kherson and Ukraine’s
south.
3
rd
Army Corps elements are unlikely to generate effective combat power,
however. Better equipment does not necessarily make more effective forces when the personnel are
not well-trained or disciplined, as many members of the 3
rd
Army Corps’ volunteer units are not.
Previous military experience is not required for many of 3
rd
Army Corps’ volunteer elements.
Images
of the 3
rd
Army Corp elements have shown the volunteers to be physically unfit and old.
Analysts have
also noted that Russia’s lack of experienced non-commissioned officers (NCOs) will hurt the 3
rd
Army
Corps effectiveness.
ISW has previously commented on reports of indiscipline among the personnel of
the 3rd Army Corps as well.
Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command stated that a 10-person Russian sabotage and
reconnaissance group attempted assault operations in Kherson Oblast on August 27,
suggesting that Russian offensive capabilities in Kherson Oblast have degraded even
further.
A 10-person group amounts to a squad, which is too small to act effectively as a maneuver
unit. If the Southern Operational Command correctly reported the size and mission of this unit, it would
indicate that Russian ground forces in Ukraine have degraded to the point that they are attempting to
conduct offensive operations and echelons too low to make meaningful gains. ISW has no independent
