1 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 23
Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, George Barros, and Frederick W.
Kagan
August 23, 8:45 pm ET
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Russian government sources confirmed that Russia is bringing Ukrainian children to
Russia and having Russian families adopt them. Russian federal subject (region) Krasnodar
Krai’s Family and Childhood Administration posted about a program under which Russian authorities
transferred over 1,000 children from Mariupol to Tyumen, Irkutsk, Kemerov, and Altay Krai where
Russian families have adopted them.
The Administration stated that over 300 children are still waiting
to “meet their new families” and that citizens who decide to adopt these children will be provided with
a one-time bonus by the state.
Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) additionally reported
that Russian officials transferred 30 Ukrainian children from Khartsyzk, Ilovaysk, and Zuhres in
occupied Donetsk Oblast to Nizhny Novgorod under the guise of having the children participate in
youth educational-training programs.
The forcible transfer of children of one group to another “with
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group” is a violation of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
Russian authorities are deploying security forces to Luhansk Oblast likely in response to
waning support for the war and growing unwillingness to fight among Luhansk
residents. The LNR Internal Ministry reported on August 23 that LNR Internal Ministry personnel
conducted joint patrols with consolidated police detachments from the Internal Ministries of St.
Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast in Starobilsk, Shchastya, and Stanystia, occupied Luhansk Oblast.
The LNR Internal Ministry also reported on August 22 that Rosgvardia (Russian national guard) units
conducted security for Russian Flag Day celebrations in Starobilsk.
Ukraine‘s Main Intelligence
Directorate (GUR) reported that Rosgvardia elements in Dovzhansk (formerly Sverdlovsk), Luhansk
Oblast are not subordinate to the local LNR forces and that Rosgvardia conducted a search of an LNR
official in Dovzhansk.
The deployment of Russian security forces to police occupied areas of Luhansk
Oblast supports ISW’s previous assessment that LNR residents and possibly militia forces may be
unwilling to continue fighting now that they have reached the Luhansk Oblast borders.
Recent
intensified Russian efforts to forcibly mobilize residents in Luhansk likely exacerbated this
disillusionment, and Russian authorities may be increasing Russian security forces’ presence in
Luhansk to suppress any internal instability and/or because they are losing confidence in indigenous
Luhansk forces.
Russian authorities’ deployment of Rosgvardia elements to security duties in occupied
Luhansk Oblast diverts these forces from operations elsewhere in Ukraine, likely
contributing to the broader Russian failure to translate limited tactical gains into
operational successes. ISW previously assessed that Russian forces had likely exhausted their
momentum from territorial gains around Avdiivka and Bakhmut, Donetsk Oblast – a very small section
of the whole Ukrainian theater – partially due to their inability to allocate sufficient resources to
offensive operations.
LNR forces’ unwillingness to fight in the war, coupled with Rosgvardia forces’
presence in the rear instead of near the front will likely contribute to continued Russian failures to make
significant territorial gains.
