1 Institute for the Study of War & The Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 21
Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, Layne Philipson, and
Frederick W. Kagan
August 21, 9:30 pm ET
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Russian forces’ momentum from territorial gains around Bakhmut and Avdiivka in late
July is likely exhausted, and Russian attacks in eastern Ukraine are likely culminating
although very small Russian advances will likely continue. Russian forces seized
Novoluhanske and the Vuhlehirska Thermal Power Plant (TPP) southeast of Bakhmut on July 25 and
26, respectively, consolidating Russian control around difficult water features after many weeks of
fighting. Russian sources celebrated these gains as a significant military victory without noting that
Ukrainian military Ukrainian forces successfully broke contact and withdrew from the area.
1
Russian
forces also celebrated the capture of Ukrainian fortifications around the Butivka Coal Mine ventilation
shaft southwest of Avdiivka, after Ukrainian forces withdrew from the area on July 30.
2
Russian forces
capitalized on these gains to a limited extent and have been attacking toward Bakhmut from the
northeast and southeast, and around Avdiivka, but these attacks are now stalling. Russian forces have
not made significant territorial gains around Bakhmut or Avdiivka since their advances through
Novoluhanske, the power plant, the Butivka Coal Mine, and a few small settlements near those areas.
Russian forces’ failure to capitalize on prior gains around Bakhmut and Avdiivka is an
example of a more fundamental Russian military problem—the demonstrated inability
to translate tactical gains into operational successes. Russian forces have consistently failed to
take advantage of tactical breakthroughs to maneuver into Ukrainian rear areas or unhinge significant
parts of the Ukrainian defensive lines. They therefore continually give the Ukrainians time to disengage
tactically and re-establish defensible positions against which the Russians must then launch new
deliberate attacks. This phenomenon helps explain the extremely slow rate of Russian advances in the
east and strongly suggests that the Russians will be unable to take much more ground in the coming
months unless the situation develops in unforeseen ways. Russian forces will likely remain unable to
commit enough resources to any one offensive operation to regain the momentum necessary for
significant territorial advances that translate to operational successes. Russian forces will also need to
generate and commit additional assault groups, equipment, and morale to resume even these limited
territorial advances yielding small tactical gains.
Russian forces likely face issues repairing combat aircraft due to Western sanctions and
may be attempting to bypass these sanctions by leveraging Belarusian connections with
less severe sanctions. The Ukrainian Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated that the Russian
and Belarusian Defense Ministries signed “urgent” contracts on August 20 to repair and restore Russian
military aviation equipment on Belarusian territory reportedly for further use in Ukraine.
3
Western
sanctions against Russia have largely banned the transfer of equipment to the state of Russia as a whole,
while sanctions against Belarus largely target individual Belarusian entities.
4
Western countries have
previously sanctioned Belarusian industrial-military complex entities producing radar systems,
automobiles, and repairing tracked vehicles, but it is unclear to what extent the sanctions impacted
Belarusian import of aviation repair parts.
5
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces
