
1 Institute for the Study of War & AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 19
Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Layne Philipson, George Barros, and Frederick W.
Kagan
August 19, 7:30 pm ET
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Recent Ukrainian strikes on Russian military and transportation infrastructure in
Crimea and Kherson Oblast are likely reducing Russian confidence in the security of
Russian rear areas. Reports from August 18 about Ukrainian strikes are affecting the Russian
information space despite the fact that these reports were likely overblown. Available open-source
evidence indicates that Ukrainian forces did not conduct a successful kinetic attack against either the
Stary Oskol Air Base in Belgorod or Belbek Air Base in Crimea on August 18. Geolocated footage shows
that a fire started at a field just south of the Stary Oskol Airfield (rather than at the airfield itself), and
satellite imagery shows Russian forces transporting ammunition and military equipment to a forest
close to the field.
An unspecified Russian Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official reiterated that Russian
air defenses near the Kerch Strait Bridge activated against a Ukrainian unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)
rather than an incoming strike.
There is no visual evidence of damage to either air base of as August
19. Geolocated footage shows no explosions or evidence of kinetic activity near the Belbek Air Base
overnight on August 18-19, lending credence to claims that footage reportedly showing the explosion is
recycled footage misattributed to the Belbek Air Base.
As ISW reported on August 18, Russian sources
largely reported on and disseminated these false or exaggerated reports, indicating broader Russian
panic.
Russian authorities are visibly increasing security measures in Crimea, indicating growing worry
among Russian authorities and civilians about the threat of Ukrainian strikes on rear areas previously
believed to be secure. Russian authorities installed checkpoints to search Ukrainian cars and identify
saboteurs in Sevastopol.
Certain Russian milbloggers made dramatic, pessimistic assessments that
Ukrainian forces used strikes on the Kerch Strait Bridge and Belbek Air Base to conduct reconnaissance
on Russian air and missile defense readiness and make assessments for new attacks, particularly the
feasibility of a large strike.
Ukraine’s Center for Strategic Communications (UA StratCom) reported on
August 19 that Russian forces are not in control of the situation in Crimea as evidenced by the blocking
of the Kerch Strait Bridge and activation of air alarms in Sevastopol for the first time since the start of
the invasion.
UA StratCom warned that Ukrainian forces have not yet struck the Kerch Strait Bridge
with full capabilities and that prior Ukrainian strikes on the bridge demonstrate that the bridge is not
as safe as the Russians previously believed.
The situation at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) remained largely
unchanged on August 19, despite the Russian Ministry of Defense’s August 18 claims
that Ukrainian forces would stage a provocation at the ZNPP on August 19. Russian
sources claimed that Ukrainian forces shelled the ZNPP at night on August 18-19 but did not claim
that Ukrainian forces launched a large-scale attack on the facility, contrary to Russian Ministry of
Defense (MoD) statements on August 18.
Zaporizhia Oblast Head Oleksandr Starukh emphasized on
August 19 that the situation at the ZNPP remains tense but under control.
Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that Russian authorities are
likely preparing to hold show trials for Ukrainian soldiers in Mariupol around August