Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s
Critical Threats Project, 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment
Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Angela Howard, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan
August 13, 8pm ET
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated
daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Ukrainian forces are continuing efforts to disrupt Russian ground lines of communication
(GLOCs) that support Russian forces on the right bank of the Dnipro River. Ukrainian forces struck
the bridge on the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (HPP) dam again on August 13, reportedly rendering the
bridge unusable by heavy vehicles.
Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command had previously reported on
August 10 that the Kakhovka HPP dam bridge was unfit for use.
The Kakhovka bridge was the only road bridge
Russian forces could use following Ukrainian forces’ successful efforts to put the Antonivsky road bridge out of
commission. The UK Defense Ministry has claimed that Russian forces now have no bridges usable to bring
heavy equipment or supplies over the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast and must rely mainly on the pontoon ferry
they have established near the Antonivsky road bridge.
ISW cannot confirm at this time whether Russian forces
can use the Antonivsky rail bridge to resupply forces on the right bank of the Dnipro River.
Russian forces cannot support mechanized operations at scale without a reliable GLOC. Bringing ammunition,
fuel, and heavy equipment sufficient for offensive or even large-scale defensive operations across pontoon ferries
or by air is impractical if not impossible. If Ukrainian forces have disrupted all three bridges and can prevent the
Russians from restoring any of them to usability for a protracted period then Russian forces on the west bank of
the Dnipro will likely lose the ability to defend themselves against event limited Ukrainian counterattacks.
Indicators of degraded Russian supplies resulting from the disruption of Russian GLOCs over the Dnipro River
would include: observed fuel and ammunition shortages among Russian forces in western Kherson Oblast;
abandoned Russian vehicles; decreased intensity and, finally, cessation of Russian ground assaults and artillery
attacks; possibly increased instances of Russian looting; increased reports from Russian soldiers about supply
shortfalls; increased numbers of Russian prisoners of war taken by Ukrainian forces; and an observed absence
of new heavy machinery transported to western Kherson. Such indicators could take days or weeks to observe
depending on how much Russian forces have been able to stockpile supplies on the west bank of the Dnipro and
how successful Ukrainian forces are at finding and destroying those stockpiles while keeping the bridges
inoperable.
Ukrainian Mykolaiv Oblast Head Vitaly Kim reported that unspecified Russian military command elements left
upper Kherson Oblast and relocated to the left bank of the Dnipro River, suggesting that the Russian military
leadership is concerned about being trapped on the wrong side of the river.
Ukrainian Advisor to the Minister
of Internal Affairs Rostislav Smirnov also stated that Russia has deployed 90% of its air assault forces
(presumably 90% of those deployed in Ukraine) to unspecified locations in southern Ukraine to augment Russian
defenses or possibly prepare for Russian counteroffensives.
It is unclear whether the Russian airborne units
Smirnov mentioned are concentrated exclusively in Kherson Oblast or also deployed near Zaporizhia. Elements
of the Russian 7
th
Airborne Division are known to be operating in Kherson Oblast as of at least August 10.
The
concentration of Russian Airborne Forces in western Kherson Oblast could indicate Russian efforts to use forces
to defend against a Ukrainian counteroffensive that they are more likely to be able to exfiltrate by air if they are
unable to hold the Ukrainians back or reestablish their GLOCs. Airborne forces are easier to move by aircraft
than regular mechanized forces, of course, although the Russians could find it challenging and very risky to try
to move forces by air given Ukrainian attacks on airfields in Kherson Oblast and Russian failure to secure air
superiority.
Russian forces may be reprioritizing advances in northeastern Donetsk Oblast in order to draw
attention from Ukrainian counteroffensive actions in Southern Ukraine. Russian forces had
