Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 7
Kateryna Stepanenko, Katherine Lawlor, Karolina Hird, George Barros, and
Frederick W. Kagan
August 7, 8 pm ET
Click here
to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map
is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Russian occupation officials may be accelerating their preparations for illegitimate
pseudo-referenda on the Russian annexation of occupied Ukrainian territory. The
Ukrainian Mayor of Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast, Ivan Fedorov, reported on August 7 that
resistance among Ukrainian residence has forced Russian authorities to “constantly” change their
plans for a referendum. Fedorov claimed that occupation authorities had planned a single day of
voting but are now considering seven days of “voting from home” in which armed Russian military
personnel will go house to house and “interview” Melitopol residents.
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Fedorov claimed that only
about 10% of the civilians remaining in Melitopol support Russia’s occupation and warned that
Russian soldiers will threaten to shoot residents who do not vote for annexation.
2
Ukrainian
Kherson Administration Advisor Sergey Khlan noted that occupation authorities have not fully
set conditions for a referendum as of August 7 but are accelerating their preparation after a three-
week pause in preparations, which Khlan attributed to Ukrainian HIMARS attacks on Russian
occupation logistics.
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Occupation authorities could also alter the timeline of their sham referenda
in response to changing realities on the ground, including a Ukrainian counteroffensive. Khlan
reported that the preliminary referendum date remains September 11.
By removing in-person voting options and transitioning to house-to-house surveys, Russian
occupation authorities are increasing their opportunities to directly intimidate Ukrainian
civilians. This effort is unnecessary to rig the vote to the outcome the Kremlin desires but does
make any independent oversight of the vote nearly impossible. Occupation authorities may also
turn these “surveys” into intelligence gathering operations to weed out Ukrainian opposition in
occupied areas. Removing in-person polling stations removes many requirements for bureaucrats
to staff those locations. Russian forces have struggled to recruit people into these positions from
occupied populations. In-home voting also limits opportunities for partisan attacks on those
locations.
The Kremlin may order different types of voting in different occupied locations depending on
perceived local support, perceived risk of partisan attacks, and bureaucratic capacity. For
example, the Ukrainian head of the Luhansk Oblast Civil-Military Administration, Serhiy Haidai,
reported on August 7 that Russian occupation authorities in Luhansk Oblast have identified
venues to host their sham annexation referendum in person.
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Haidai reported that Russian
occupation authorities are actively campaigning for annexation by distributing propagandist
newspapers and tying the provision of humanitarian aid including food, water, and construction
materials to participation in the pseudo-referendum. Haidai said that the practice amounts to
blackmail: “we [the Russians] will help you [Ukrainian civilians] meet your basic needs, while you
go to the ‘referendum.’ Otherwise, die, and we will fabricate the result without you.” Russia has
occupied parts of Luhansk Oblast since 2014 and likely has greater capacity to mobilize
collaborators to administer polling stations than in newly occupied areas. ISW reported on August
3 that occupation authorities in Donetsk Oblast may allow in-person and online participation,
providing multiple levers for Russian officials to alter the results.
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