1 Institute for the Study of War & AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment
Karolina Hird, George Barros, Katherine Lawlor, Layne Philipson, and Frederick W.
Kagan
July 19, 7:30 pm ET
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Calls among Russian nationalist and pro-war voices for Russian President Vladimir
Putin to expand Russia’s war aims, mobilize the state fully for war, and drop the pretext
that Russia is not engaged in a war reached a crescendo on July 19. Former Russian militant
commander and nationalist milblogger Igor Girkin presented an extensive list of military, economic,
and political actions that he argues the Kremlin must take to win the war in Ukraine; first among this
list is abandoning the rhetoric of the “special military operation” and defining the official goals of the
war in Ukraine.
Girkin advocated for expansive territorial aims beyond the Kremlin’s stated ambitions
in Donbas, including the reunification of the entire territory of “Novorossiya” (which Girkin maintains
includes Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Donetsk, and Luhansk
oblasts as well as Kryvyi Rih) with the Russian Federation and the creation of a Malorossiya state (all
of Ukraine up to the Polish border), which Girkin claims should be reunified with Russia through the
Russia-Belarus Union State. Girkin also called for the Kremlin to shift the Russian economy fully to a
war footing and to carry out extensive mobilization measures including forced conscription and the
(further) suspension of Russians’ rights.
Girkin has often criticized what he views as a lack of ambition
and decisive action in the Kremlin’s handling of the war in Ukraine through his calls for maximalist
objectives and measures to support territorial gains. His newest list of demands adds to the growing
discontent within the Russian pro-war nationalist zeitgeist.
While Girkin’s July 19 post is an acerbic critique of the Kremlin’s intentions in Ukraine,
other Russian milbloggers sought to shape a narrative favoring Putin while advancing
the same maximalist aims by suggesting that the Kremlin has been purposefully setting
conditions for a protracted war in Ukraine since the war began. Russian milblogger Yuri
Kotyenok claimed that Russia has been pursuing the “Syrianization” of the war in Ukraine by never
articulating specific deadlines or goals for operations in Ukraine.
The explicit invocation of protracted
Russian operations in Syria suggests that certain Russian nationalist voices are setting conditions for a
long war in a way that saves face for the Kremlin given Russia’s failure to secure its military objectives
in Ukraine in the very short period that the Kremlin initially planned.
Putin could simply ignore the milbloggers, although he has shown concern for their
positions in the recent past, or he could play off their narratives in several ways.
He might
wait and see what resonance their calls for full mobilization and broader war aims have within the
portions of the Russian population he cares most about. He might hope that their semi-independent
calls for more extreme measures could fuel support for an expansion of aims and mobilization that he
desires but feels Russians remain unprepared to accept. He may instead reject their calls for grander
ambitions and greater sacrifices, thereby presenting himself as the moderate leader refraining from
demanding too much from his people.
US officials reported that Russia plans to annex occupied Ukrainian territory as soon as
autumn 2022, confirming ISW’s May 2022 assessment. US National Security Council
Spokesperson John Kirby announced that the Kremlin is beginning to roll out a version of its 2014
“annexation playbook” in Ukraine and is “examining detailed plans” to annex Kherson, Zaporizhia, and
all of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, citing newly declassified intelligence.
Kirby confirmed ISW’s long-
