1 Institute for the Study of War & The Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 18
Karolina Hird, George Barros, Layne Philipson, and
Frederick W. Kagan
July 18, 5:30 pm ET
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu’s July 18 meeting with the commander of the
Eastern group of forces Lieutenant General Rustam Muradov supports ISW’s
assessment that Moscow will not prioritize an attack to seize Slovyansk in this stage of
the operation but will instead focus on seizing Siversk and Bakhmut.
1
The Russian Ministry
of Defense (MoD) announced on July 18 that Shoigu inspected the Eastern group and directed Muradov
to prioritize the destruction of Ukrainian long-range missiles and artillery systems. This is the first time
ISW has observed explicit mention of the Eastern force grouping operating in Ukraine in this phase of
the war. The Russian MoD previously reported that the Central and Southern force groups took part in
the capture of Luhansk Oblast under the leadership of Colonel General Aleksandr Lapin and Army
General Sergey Surovikin.
2
The Eastern group of forces is likely comprised of elements of the Russian
Eastern Military District (EMD), which have been active along the Izyum axis in Kharkiv Oblast.
3
It is
still unclear whether Muradov also directly controls operations around Kharkiv City. Muradov’s forces
are operating in the Izyum-Slovyansk direction ostensibly with the objective of eventually seizing
Slovyansk itself, and it is noteworthy that Shoigu did not direct Muradov to prioritize taking ground
along this axis at this time. Muradov holds a lower rank than both Lapin and Surovikin, suggesting that
the Kremlin considers the Izyum-Slovyansk area to be a lower priority than capturing territory in
Donetsk Oblast as part of the wider Donbas campaign. The Kremlin likely is focusing military resources
and high-rank leadership on localized and discrete gains around Siversk and Bakhmut, despite Shoigu’s
earlier calls for the intensification of operations along all axes of advance.
4
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s likely effort to shield ethnic Russians from high
levels of mobilization may trigger resistance in some of the ethnic enclaves that seem to
be disproportionately bearing the burden of war. Russian Telegram channel Rybar released a
report on July 18 about the Novaya Tuva movement—an anti-war organization comprised of activists
from the Tuvan ethnic minority enclave.
5
Rybar accused the Novaya Tuva movement of disseminating
anti-war propaganda and inciting ethnic discord within the Russian Federation. This report is
noteworthy in the context of the recent increase in the formation of regionally-based volunteer
battalions through Russia, many of which fall along distinct ethnic lines.
6
ISW and others have
previously noted the prevalence of non-ethnic Russian battalions fighting in Ukraine, which include
troops from Chechnya, South Ossetia, Tuva, Tartarstan, Bashkortostan, Chuvashia, and others.
7
These
indicators suggest that Putin may be unwilling to conduct general mobilization in part due to a
reluctance to mobilize large numbers of ethnic Russians. Rybar’s post as well as previous reporting on
a “Free Buryatia” anti-war group bring to the fore the risk that Putin’s apparent desire to have non-
Russians bear the brunt of the war at this stage could create domestic tension in these regions.
