1 Institute for the Study of War & The Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 13
Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan
July 13, 7:30 pm ET
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
The Kremlin likely ordered Russian “federal subjects” (regions) to form volunteer
battalions to participate in the Russian invasion of Ukraine, instead of declaring partial
or full mobilization in Russia. Russian war correspondent and milblogger Maksim Fomin stated
that Russia has begun a “volunteer mobilization,” where every region must generate at least one
volunteer battalion.
1
The term “volunteer mobilization” likely implies that the Kremlin ordered the 85
“federal subjects” (regions, including occupied Sevastopol and Crimea) to recruit and financially
incentivize volunteers to form new battalions, rather than referring to literal mobilization relying on
conscription or the compulsory activation of all reservists in Russia. Russian outlets reported that
regional officials recruit men up to 50 years old (or 60 for separate military specialties) for six-month
contracts and offer salaries averaging 220,000 to 350,000 rubles per month (approximately $3,750 to
$6,000).
2
Separate regions offer an immediate enlistment bonus that averages 200,000 rubles
(approximately $3,400) issued from the region‘s budget and social benefits for the servicemen and their
families.
3
Russian media has already confirmed the creation or deployment of volunteer battalions in
Kursk, Primorskyi Krai, Republic of Bashkortostan, Chuvashia Republic, Chechnya, Republic of
Tatarstan, Moscow City, Perm, Nizhny Novgorod, and Orenburg Oblasts in late June and early July.
4
Tyumen Oblast officials announced the formation of volunteer units (not specifically a battalion) on
July 7.
5
Volunteer battalions could generate around 34,000 new servicemen by the end of August
if each federal subject produces at least one military unit of 400 men. Some Russian reports
and documentation suggest that the Kremlin seeks to recruit an estimated 400 soldiers per battalion,
who will receive a month of training before deploying to Ukraine.
6
The number of men may vary as
some federal subjects such as Republic of Tatarstan and Chechnya are establishing two and four
volunteer battalions, respectively.
7
It is possible that some federal subjects may delay or not participate
in the establishment of the battalions, with officials in Volgograd reportedly remaining silent on the
formation of the new units.
8
Newly formed battalions are currently departing to training grounds and
will likely complete their month-long training by end of August but they will not be combat ready in
such a short time period.
9
Russian milbloggers criticized the Russian military on July 12 for sourcing Iranian UAVs
to improve artillery targeting in Ukraine while failing to address the command issues
that more severely limit the effectiveness of Russian artillery. Russian Telegram channel
Rybar claimed on July 12 that Russian requests and approval for artillery fire pass through a convoluted
chain of command, resulting in a delay of several hours to several days between Russian ground forces
requesting artillery fire, Russian targeting, and conducting the actual strikes.
10
Rybar claimed that
Russian forces in Syria reduced the time between targeting and striking to under an hour.
11
Rybar
claimed that while the Russian need for more UAVs is clear and that Iranian UAVs helped achieve a
target-to-fire time of 40 minutes in Syrian training grounds additional UAVs do not solve the problems
of overcentralized Russian command and overreliance on artillery in Ukraine.
12
Russian milblogger
Voyennyi Osvedomitel’ claimed that Russian forces had faced the same overcentralized command
