1 Institute for the Study of War & AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment
Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, and Frederick W. Kagan
July 10, 8:30 pm ET
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Russian forces are in the midst of a theater-wide operational pause in Ukraine. This
operational pause has been largely characterized by Russian troops regrouping to rest, refit, and
reconstitute; heavy artillery fire in critical areas to set conditions for future ground advances; and
limited probing attacks to identify Ukrainian weakness and structure appropriate tactical responses. As
ISW has previously noted, an operational pause does not mean a complete cessation of hostilities,
rather that ongoing hostilities are more preparative in nature.
Russian milblogger Rybar provided more evidence of tensions between the Russian
military command and Russian war correspondents.
Russian war correspondents include
journalists operating at the frontlines and Russian milbloggers commentating on information available
in the open-source (and likely also drawn from friends in the military). Rybar noted that Russian
military commanders responsible for wartime information operations are attempting to silence Russian
milbloggers and war correspondents to conceal the Russian military’s blunders during the invasion of
Ukraine. Rybar noted that Russian military commanders remain shaped by negative experiences during
the Chechnya wars when war correspondents exposed problems at the frontline to the Kremlin and
embarrassed Russian officers.
Rybar stated that the Russian Defense Ministry and possibly actors within the
presidential administration are actively attempting to silence unofficial coverage of the
Russian war in Ukraine. Rybar expressed support for a Telegram article by Donetsk People’s
Republic (DNR) Deputy Information Minister (and milblogger) Daniil Bezsonov that criticized the
Kremlin's apparent effort to promote self-censorship among war correspondents.
Rybar noted that
Adviser to the Russian Defense Minister Andrey Ilnitsky called for such self-censorship on May 26 and
had encouraged Russian war correspondents to report on the war only from an ideological standpoint
without getting into operational details.
Rybar speculated that the presidential administration or other
Russian officials ordered Ilnitsky to promote censorship among war correspondents who publish
frontline updates in real-time.
Rybar noted that the relationship between the Russian military command and war
correspondents particularly soured after Russian President Vladimir Putin met with war
correspondents during the St. Petersburg Economic Forum on June 17. Rybar claimed that
two prominent war correspondents told Putin about the “mess” at the frontlines during the closed-door
meeting, effectively bypassing the Russian Defense Ministry in presenting their negative views directly
to the commander in chief. The event Rybar is describing likely occurred: Kremlin Spokesperson
Dmitry Peskov announced on June 12 that Putin would hold a largely closed-door meeting with Russian
war correspondents, and Russian propagandist Margarita Simonyan confirmed that Putin had a
“candid” and long conversation with frontline journalists after the event.
Rybar noted that Russian
Defense Ministry began to identify war correspondents as a “threat” after this engagement whereas
previously it had perceived them as a “poorly controlled problem.”
Putin likely held the June 17 meeting to defuse milblogger discontent, which had become
evident and dramatic after the disastrous failed river crossing attempt at Bilohorivka in
mid-May. If that was his aim, he failed to win them over, as the milbloggers have remained staunchly
