俄罗斯进攻性战役评估,2022年7月9日

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1 Institute for the Study of War & AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 9
Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan
July 9, 6:15 pm ET
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Russian-backed occupation authorities in Kharkiv Oblast stated that Kharkiv Oblast is
an “inalienable part of Russian land,” indicating that the Kremlin likely intends to annex
part or all of Kharkiv Oblast.
1
The Russian occupation government in Kharkiv Oblast unveiled a
new flag for the occupation regime in Kharkiv Oblast containing the Russian imperial double-headed
eagle and symbols from the 18th century Kharkiv coat of arms.
2
The Russian occupation government
stated that the imagery in the flag is a “symbol of the historical roots of Kharkiv Oblast as an inalienable
part of Russian land, indicating that the Kremlin seeks to annex portions of Kharkiv Oblast to Russia
and likely seeks to capture all of Kharkiv Oblast if it can.
3
The Kharkiv Oblast occupation government’s
speed in establishing a civilian administration on July 6 and introducing martial law in occupied
Kharkiv Oblast on July 8 further indicates that the Kremlin is aggressively pursuing the legitimization
and consolidation of the Kharkiv Oblast occupation administration’s power to support this broader
territorial aim.
4
The Kharkiv Oblast occupation government’s explicit use of Imperial Russian imagery
and rhetoric pointing clearly at annexation, rather than using imagery and rhetoric supporting the
establishment of a “people’s republic,” reinforces ISW’s prior assessment that the Kremlin has broader
territorial aims than capturing Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts or even holding southern Ukraine.
5
The Kremlin has likely used a leaked letter from mothers demanding the ban of
journalist activity on the frontlines to promote self-censorship among pro-Russian
milbloggers and war correspondents. Russian opposition outlet Meduza released a letter from
mothers of an Astrakhan-based platoon that blamed Kremlin-sponsored Izvestia war correspondent
Valentin Trushnin for reporting the details of Russian positions in a way that led to the deaths of their
sons.
6
Meduza removed the letter from its website on July 8. First Deputy of the Donetsk People’s
Republic (DNR) Information Minister and milblogger Daniil Bezsonov reported noticing suggestions
from unspecified “faceless experts” to censor his posts regarding Russian war efforts.
7
Bezsonov noted
that Russian war correspondents received necessary accreditations from the Kremlin and follow
protocol when reporting from the frontline to refrain from exposing Russian positions. Bezsonov also
argued that Russian war correspondents took the initiative to keep Russians updated on the situation
on the front line from the first days of the war, while Russian “big bosses” failed to launch an
information campaign to counter claimed Ukrainian information warfare. Several Russian milbloggers
shared Bezsonov’s remarks, with proxy serviceman Maksim Fomin stating that Russian Defense
Ministry briefings are not sufficient to replace combat footage.
8
The Kremlin faces challenges directly censoring pro-Russian milbloggers and war
correspondents but will likely continue to look for opportunities to promote self-
censorship. Moscow has not demonstrated the ability to compel Telegram to delete or control the
content of channels, and so would likely have to threaten individual milbloggers with legal or extra-
legal action to stop them from publishing on that platform. Russia could prevent war correspondents
publishing in regular media outlets from writing stories or deprive them of access to the front lines. But
both the milbloggers and the war correspondents are explicitly pro-war and patriotic, often ultra-
nationalist, with large followings likely concentrated among Russian President Vladimir Putin’s key
supporters. Threatening or suppressing them directly could backfire if Putin’s motivation in doing so is
to stop them from undermining support for the war or questioning authority. Actions such as the use
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