1 Institute for the Study of War & AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment
Kateryna Stepanenko, Frederick W. Kagan, and George Barros
July 8, 7:00 pm ET
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Luhansk Oblast Administration Head Serhiy Haidai stated that Russian forces are not
conducting an operational pause as of July 8 and are continuing to shell settlements and
deploy additional tank units to Donbas.
It notes that “Normally, operational pauses are
planned to regenerate combat power or augment sustainment and forces for the next phase.” It observes
that “The primary drawback to operational pauses is the risk of forfeiting strategic or operational
initiative.” It therefore recommends that “If pauses are necessary, the [commander] can alternate
pauses among components to ensure continuous pressure on the enemy or adversary through offensive
actions by some components while other components pause.” Soviet military theory regarded
operational pauses in a similar fashion—sometimes necessary, but always dangerous.
The Russian military command, which announced an operational pause on July 7, has apparently
recognized the need for a pause given the state of Russian forces at this point in the campaign. The
Russian troops that have completed the seizure of Severodonetsk and Lysychansk are clearly in need of
regenerating combat power and building up supporting capabilities, including supply, before launching
another large-scale offensive operation. Numerous reports from various sources show that they are
engaged in both activities. They have naturally and necessarily ceased efforts to conduct large-scale
offensive operations in this sector while they reorganized, reinforce, and resupply their tired troops—
in other words, they are in an operational pause in this sector.
Recognizing the danger of allowing the Ukrainians to seize the initiative and go over to an offensive of
their own, however, Russian forces continue to conduct more-limited offensive operations in this sector
and elsewhere along the front line. Those operations involve smaller Russian forces than had been
involved in the attacks on Severodonetsk and Lysychansk pursuing more limited and localized
objectives with less determination and willingness to take casualties compared with their behavior
during the fights for the two cities. When the Russian military command has determined that it has
adequately prepared for a renewed major offensive operation, it will likely resume larger-scale ground
offensives with more troops and a greater determination than it is currently showing. The transition
out of the operational pause may be gradual and difficult to discern at once, just as the transition into
it appeared gradual. Skillful campaign design aims to achieve precisely such an effect in order to
persuade the enemy that no pause is contemplated or underway, or that it will be too short to be of
benefit to the enemy, and thereby convince the enemy that it does not have the opportunity to seize the
initiative and go over to a counter-offensive of its own. Russian campaign design, inadequate as it has
generally been, is nevertheless good enough to manifest this basic principle of operational art.
Russian milbloggers are continuing to show rhetorical opposition to the Kremlin by
faulting the Russian Defense Ministry for making Russian logistics vulnerable to the
Ukrainian strikes via US-provided HIMARS rocket systems. Russian milbloggers are notably
criticizing the Russian military command instead of expressing patriotic hatred toward Western
suppliers of HIMARS as one would have expected of the ultra-nationalist, pro-war Telegram channels.
Former Russian military commander Igor Girkin, an outspoken Russian nationalist who commanded
