俄罗斯进攻性战役评估,2022年7月4日

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1 Institute for the Study of War & AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment
Karolina Hird, George Barros, Grace Mappes, and Frederick W. Kagan
July 4, 7:00 pm ET
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Russian President Vladimir Putin celebrated the Russian seizure of Lysychansk and the
Luhansk Oblast border and appeared to direct the Russian military to conduct an
operational pause. Putin met with Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu on July 4 to discuss
recent Russian gains in Luhansk Oblast and presented Colonel General Alexander Lapin and Major
General Esedulla Abachev with the “Hero of Russia” award for their leadership during the Lysychansk
operation.
1
Putin and Shoigu presented the capture of Lysychansk and Luhansk Oblast as a major
victory for Russian forces in Ukraine. Putin also stated that the Russian units that participated in the
battle for Lysychansk should rest to increase their combat capabilities.
2
Putin‘s public comment was
likely meant to signal his concern for the welfare of his troops in the face of periodic complaints in
Russia about the treatment of Russian soldiers. His comment was also likely accurateRussian troops
that fought through Severodonetsk and Lysychansk very likely do need a significant period in which to
rest and refit before resuming large-scale offensive operations. It is not clear, however, that the Russian
military will accept the risks of a long enough operational pause to allow these likely exhausted forces
to regain their strength.
Former Russian military commander Igor Girkin, an ardent Russian nationalist who
commanded militants during the 2014 war in Donbas, posted a scathing critique of the
Kremlin’s handling of the war on his Telegram channel and questioned the significance
of the seizure of Lysychansk. He suggested that Russian forces had paid too high a price
for a limited gain. In a series of Telegram posts published prior to Putin’s meeting with Shoigu on
July 4, Girkin complained that Russian forces have failed to meet the announced goals of the “second
stage of the special operation” (the operations in eastern Ukraine following Russia’s retreat from Kyiv)
to his nearly 400,000 subscribers.
3
Girkin noted that the Ukrainian defense of Lysychansk was
deliberately designed to inflict maximum damage on Russian troops and burn through Russian
manpower and equipment. He strongly suggested that accepting battle on the Ukrainians‘ terms was a
significant misstep by the Russian leadership.
4
Girkin stated (before Putin’s remarks were made public)
that Russian troops need time to rest and replenish in order to recover their offensive potential and
noted that the lack of individual soldier replacements and unit rotations is severely degrading morale.
He warned, however, that taking time to reconstitute offensive capability would allow Ukrainian troops
to seize the initiative and further threaten Russian gains.
5
Girkin additionally claimed that Russian
forces have limited prospects of advancing elsewhere in Ukraine due to Ukrainian personnel and
equipment superiority.
6
Girkin’s critique is a noteworthy example of the way Russian milbloggers and military enthusiasts have
become disillusioned with the Kremlin’s handling and execution of operations in Ukraine, particularly
after the dramatic failed river crossing attempt at Bilohorivka in early May.
7
Girkin’s statements directly
undermine the Kremlin’s efforts to frame Lysychansk as a significant victory or turning point and show
that the disillusionment amongst ultra-nationalist elements in the Russian information space continues
to run deep. Girkin’s assessment of Russian military failures notably aligns with much of ISW’s (and
other Western agencies’ and experts’) analysis, suggesting that he and some other milbloggers continue
to make and publish assessments of the situation and forecasts independent of the Kremlin line. Girkin
likely hopes to use his status as a prominent former participant in the war in Donbas in 2014 to persuade
Putin to take certain measures to secure Russian success in a war that Girkin still thinks is justified and
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