1 Institute for the Study of War & AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment
Kateryna Stepanenko, George Barros, Grace Mappes, and Frederick W. Kagan
July 3, 7:45 pm ET
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Russian forces have likely secured the Luhansk Oblast border, although pockets of
Ukrainian resistance may remain in and around Lysychansk. Russian Defense Minister
Sergey Shoigu announced that Russian forces have captured Luhansk Oblast on July 3, after seizing
Lysychansk and settlements on the Luhansk Oblast administrative border.
The Ukrainian General Staff
also announced that Ukrainian forces withdrew from Lysychansk to avoid personnel losses.
Russian
forces have likely not fully cleared Lysychansk and Luhansk Oblast as of July 3, despite Shoigu’s
announcement. The Russian Defense Ministry stated that Russian forces are still fighting within
Lysychansk to defeat encircled Ukrainian forces, but the Ukrainian withdrawal means that Russian
forces will almost certainly complete their clearing operations relatively quickly.
Russian forces will likely next advance on Siversk, though they could launch more significant attacks
on Bakhmut or Slovyansk instead or at the same time. Ukrainian forces will likely continue their
fighting withdrawal toward the E40 highway that runs from Slovyansk through Bakhmut toward
Debaltseve. It is unclear whether they will choose to defend around Siversk at this time.
Two very senior Russian commanders are reportedly responsible for the tactical activities around
Lysychansk. Commander of the Central Military District Colonel General Aleksandr Lapin and
Commander of the Russian Aerospace Forces Army General Sergey Suvorikin (who also commands
Russia’s “southern” group of troops in Ukraine) have been responsible for securing Lysychansk and the
area to the west of it respectively.
The involvement of two such senior officers in the same undertaking
in a small part of the front is remarkable and likely indicates the significance that Russian President
Vladimir Putin has attributed to securing Lysychansk and the Luhansk Oblast border as well as his lack
of confidence in more junior officers to do the job.
Ukrainian forces likely used US-provided HIMARS rocket artillery systems to strike a Russian
ammunition depot at the Melitopol airfield on July 3. Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov reported that
Ukrainian forces launched two strikes on one of the four Russian depots in Melitopol.
Russian
Telegram channel Rybar released footage of a large cloud of smoke over the city, and Russian-appointed
Melitopol Governor Yevhen Balytskyi falsely claimed that Ukrainian forces aimed to strike residential
buildings, but instead hit areas around the airfield.
The Kremlin likely seeks to expand Russian state control over private Russian companies that support
elements of Russia’s military-industrial base. The Ukrainian Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR)
reported on July 3 that the Russian government’s inability to pay Russian firms supporting Russia’s
war in Ukraine is degrading Russia’s ability to repair damaged vehicles. The GUR reported that the
directors of Russian military vehicle repair centers are not accepting new Russian equipment for repair
because the Russian military has not paid these centers for previous work.
Recently proposed Russian
legislation suggests that Kremlin leadership shares GUR’s assessment. Russian legislators in the
Russian State Duma submitted a bill on June 30 that would empower the Kremlin to introduce “special
measures in the economic sphere” enabling the Russian government to force private Russian
companies to provide supplies for Russian military operations.
The bill prohibits Russian businesses
from refusing to fulfill Russian government procurement orders connected to Russian military
operations.
