
1 Institute for the Study of War & AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment
Karolina Hird, Mason Clark, and George Barros
June 25, 5:00 pm ET
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced the commanders of the “central” and
“southern” groupings of forces in Ukraine on June 24, confirming previously rumored
changes reported on June 21.
Spokesperson for the Russian MoD Igor Konashenkov stated on
June 24 that Commander of the Central Military District Colonel General Alexander Lapin is in
command of the "central” group of forces, which is responsible for operations against Lysychansk (and
presumably Severodonetsk).
Konashenkov additionally stated that Army General Sergei Surovikin,
commander of the Russian Aerospace Forces, commands the ”southern” group of forces and oversaw
the encirclement of Hirske and Zolote.
The Russian MoD’s announcement confirms ISW’s assessment
from June 21 that the Russian high command is reshuffling and restructuring military command in
order to better organize operations in Ukraine, though the Russian MoD statement does not state when
the changes occurred.
The UK MoD confirmed that the Russian command has removed several
generals from key operational roles in Ukraine, including Commander of the Airborne Forces (VDV)
Colonel General Andrei Serdyukov and Commander of Russia’s Southern Military District Alexander
Dvornikov, who was likely was acting as overall theatre commander.
The UK MoD noted that
command of the Southern Military District will transfer to Surovikin.
The Russian MoD’s statement
notably only discusses the center and south force groupings (not the Southern Military District as a
whole), but Dvornikov has likely been removed from his previous role.
Russian forces conducted an abnormally large series of missiles strikes against
Ukrainian rear areas on June 25.
The Ukrainian Airforce Command reported that Russian forces
fired over 50 ground-, air-, and sea-based missiles at Ukraine and targeted areas in Zhytomyr, Kyiv,
Khmelmytskyi, Chernihiv, Lviv, Mykolaiv, Kharkiv, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.
The Ukrainian Main
Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that six Russian Tu-22M3 bombers departed from the
Shaykova airbase in Belarus and launched 12 Kh-22 cruise missiles at land targets in Kyiv, Sumy, and
Chernihiv Oblasts, which is the first such launch from Belarus.
The Ukrainian Airforce Command
noted that Russian forces used sea-based Kalibr missiles against targets in western Ukraine, X-22 and
ground-based Iskander and Tochka-U missiles against targets in northern Ukraine, and ONYX missiles
and Bastion complexes against targets in southern Ukraine.
Ukrainian air defense reportedly shot
down many of the missiles, which were likely intended to target critical support infrastructure in areas
of Ukraine where there is no direct combat.
Ukrainian intelligence assessed that the Kremlin is continuing covert partial
mobilization efforts in support of what it increasingly recognizes as a war of attrition in
Eastern Ukraine.
Representative of the Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Vadym
Skibitsky stated that the Kremlin recognizes it is waging a war of attrition and is conducting secretive
partial mobilization efforts while additionally mobilizing the BARS (Combat Army Reserve of the
Country) system and other constant-readiness elements. Skibitsky noted that 105 battalion tactical
groups (BTGs) are taking part in the war in Ukraine and that Russian reserve capabilities could increase
this number to anywhere between 150 and 160 BTGs but did not specify a timeframe for this
mobilization. Skibitsky reiterated that the Kremlin’s main goal is to secure control of the entire Donbas
and that its secondary priority is consolidation of its control of Kherson Oblast by September 11, when