1 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 24
Kateryna Stepanenko, Riley Bailey, George Barros, Madison Williams, and Frederick W. Kagan
December 24, 7 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily
alongside the static maps present in this report.
Note: ISW and CTP will not publish a campaign assessment (or maps) tomorrow, December 25, in observance of the
Christmas holiday. Coverage will resume Monday, December 26.
Russian forces’ rate of advance in the Bakhmut area has likely slowed in recent days, although it is too
early to assess whether the Russian offensive to capture Bakhmut has culminated. Russian milbloggers
acknowledged that Ukrainian forces in the Bakhmut area have managed to slightly slow down the pace of the Russian
advance around Bakhmut and its surrounding settlements, with one claiming that Ukrainian forces pushed back elements
of the Wagner Group to positions they held days ago.[1] Ukrainian social media sources previously claimed that Ukrainian
forces completely pushed Russian forces out of the eastern outskirts of Bakhmut around December 21.[2] ISW has also
assessed that Russian forces made slightly fewer overall advances in the Bakhmut area in November and December
combined as compared to the month of October.[3]
Russian forces will likely struggle to maintain the pace of their offensive operations in the Bakhmut area
and may seek to initiate a tactical or operational pause. The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD)
reported on December 24 that Russian forces currently lack the necessary stockpile of artillery munitions to support large-
scale offensive operations and that sustaining defensive operations along the lengthy frontline in Ukraine requires the
Russian military to expend a significant number of shells and rockets daily.[4] The Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force
released an interview on December 24 with a Ukrainian servicemember in the Bakhmut area detailing that Russian forces
have been conducting an extremely high pace of assaults on Ukrainian positions in the area with little corresponding
progress.[5] The Wagner Group’s reported heavy losses in the Bakhmut area in recent weeks have also likely strained
Russian forces’ current operational capabilities in the area.[6]
The Russian military’s personnel and munitions constraints will likely prevent it from maintaining the current high pace of
offensive operations in the Bakhmut area in the near-term. Russian forces previously allocated significant resources in a
meat-grinder effort to seize Severodonesk and Lysychansk in spring–summer 2022. Russian forces culminated after
capturing Lysychansk in early July and failed to capture neighboring Siversk to the east or Slovyansk to the northeast. The
Russian military’s fixation with conducting a highly attritional campaign to achieve the tactical objectives of capturing
Severdonetsk and Lysychansk ultimately undermined the Russian military’s ability to achieve its larger operational objective
to envelop Ukrainian forces in a cauldron along the E40 highway and eventually drive to Donetsk Oblast’s western
administrative borders. Russia’s relentless and costly push on Bakhmut may also degrade Russia’s ability to pursue long-
term objectives in the Donbas theater.
Russian siloviki may be setting information conditions to justify the nationalization of oligarchs'
resources to sponsor Russia’s war effort. Wagner financier Yeveniy Prigozhin attended the funeral of a deceased
Wagner Group mercenary in St. Petersburg on December 24, where he stated that Russia needs to confiscate luxury
possessions and accommodations from elites who ignore or do not support the war effort out of fear of losing their privileged
lifestyles.[7] Prigozhin added that these affluent individuals support a vision where ”Western curators” dominate Russia in
return for the sponsorship of their lifestyles and compared today’s Russian oligarchy to Ukraine’s or to 1990s Russia.
Prigozhin ignited a scandal regarding the burial of the Wagner serviceman in recent weeks to push his political objectives —
such as the legalization of Wagner in Russia — and his statements advocating redistribution of wealth at the funeral gained
significant traction on the Russian internet.[8] Wagner-affiliated milbloggers widely supported Prigozhin’s criticism of
Russian officials and praised his support for the war effort.[9] Prigozhin may be using such populist proposals to elevate his
authority in Russian society or influence a return of stricter nationalization measures.
Russian President Vladimir Putin also indirectly attacked Russian oligarchs on December 22, however, stating that Russians
who drain Russia’s money from abroad and do not have a connection with the country “represent a danger” to
Russia.[10] Putin claimed that while the vast majority of Russian businessmen are patriots, there are some who do not share
the sentiment. Putin concluded that "everyone strives not only to stay, to live and work in Russia but to work for the benefit
of our country.” Putin previously nationalized big businesses in the early 2000s to consolidate his authoritarian kleptocracy
and may be attempting leverage nationalization to coerce elites to support his war in Ukraine or seize their property to fund
military expenses.[11]
