Institute for the Study of War
& The Critical Threats Project
2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December
20
Kateryna Stepanenko, Riley Bailey, George Barros, Madison Williams, and Frederick W. Kagan
December 20, 8 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated
daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Intensifying Russian pressure on Belarus is degrading Belarusian President Alexander
Lukashenko’s maneuver room to avoid making concessions to the Kremlin. Russian President
Vladimir Putin’s long game to reestablish suzerainty over Belarus is making progress separate and apart from
Putin’s efforts to get Belarus more actively involved in his invasion of Ukraine. Lukashenko confirmed that
Russia “gave” Belarus an unspecified number of S-400 air defense systems during his meeting with Putin in
Minsk on December 19, confirming ISW’s 2021 forecast that Russian-made S-400 systems would begin operating
in Belarus.
Lukashenko had previously rejected S-400 systems operating in Belarus in 2020.
Lukashenko is
likely delaying acceding to Putin’s larger demands - such as committing Belarusian forces to join the invasion
against Ukraine - by making smaller concessions that he has stonewalled for years.
Russian military personnel will likely operate the Belarus-based S-400 systems. Russian personnel may operate
the S-400 systems from the so-called joint Russian-Belarusian Air Force and Air Defense Forces training center
in Grodno, Belarus – a permanent Russian military presence in Belarus that the Kremlin established in the spring
of 2021.
ISW continues to observe indicators consistent with the most dangerous course of action
(MDCOA) of a renewed Russian invasion of northern Ukraine from Belarus.
Ukrainian military
officials continue to warn about a growing Russian threat from Belarus. Ukrainian Joint Forces Commander
Serhiy Nayev stated on December 20 that Russian elements in Belarus have military potential “currently
sufficient” to create an unspecified threat to Ukraine and that these elements can conduct unspecified “tactical
actions.”
Nayev’s statement marks an inflection in Ukrainian officials’ characterization of the growing Russian
forces in Belarus; previous Ukrainian descriptions of Russian forces in Belarus did not ascribe to them tactically
significant capacities.
Independent Belarusian sources continue to report growing Russian mechanized forces
in Belarus.
About 30 Russian T-80 tanks reportedly deployed to Belarus around December 20.
These indicators support the MDCOA forecast, but that course of action remains unlikely at this time. A Russian
invasion of northern Ukraine from Belarus is not very likely imminent. Nayev reiterated that Ukraine’s defense
is prepared to defend northern Ukraine.
The Ukrainian General Staff reiterated that it has not observed Russian
forces forming strike groups in Belarus as of December 20.
ISW will continue to monitor the situation.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s frontline visit to Bakhmut on the 300th day of war is
undermining an ongoing Kremlin information operation intended to present Russian President
Vladimir Putin as an involved war leader. Zelensky made a surprise visit to Ukrainian troops serving on
the intense Bakhmut front on December 20 and presented awards.
In contrast, Putin held a senior-level award
ceremony where he celebrated Russian occupation and Kremlin officials such as proxy leaders from occupied
Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts, Russian propagandist and RT Editor-in-Chief Margarita
Simonyan, and Russian milblogger Semyon Pegov among other state officials.
ISW has previously assessed that
Putin has intensified his efforts to extricate himself and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) from persistent
criticism by making public appearances relating to various undertakings aimed at improving the Russian war
